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THE SIGNAL CABLE SENDS
In recent years, commentators, courts, and the FCC have begun
distinguishing cable from broadcast television and analogizing cable
instead to the print media in order to afford cable fuller first amend-
ment freedom than broadcasting traditionally has enjoyed. This arti-
cle challenges that approach, arguing that cable and broadcasting
have a functional similarity and are close substitutes for one another.
In fact, they form a unified cable/broadcasting medium that should
be indistinguishable, for first amendment purposes, from the print
media. In this way, cable and broadcasting each supports the other's
entitlement to full first amendment freedom.
I. INTRODUCTION
Is cable television more like broadcasting or more like the print
media such as newspapers? This question is often posed by those
attempting to determine the proper scope of regulation for the
cable medium. Much could turn on how this question is resolved.
Broadcasting traditionally, though inappropriately,' has been sub-
ject to extensive regulation based largely on the perceived scarcity
of the electromagnetic spectrum; if cable is analogized to broadcast-
ing, then it may be subject to similarly broad regulation. If, on the
other hand, cable is seen as sharing more attributes of the print me-
dia, the first amendment should shield it from government control
to the same extent that newspapers are protected.
In fact, however, this is the wrong question. The premise of
this article is that discussion of the appropriate regulation of the
electronic media must start with recognition of the close functional
similarity between cable and broadcast television. At least with re-
spect to audio/video programming, cable and broadcasting should
be viewed as essentially one medium. The basic regulatory question
then becomes: Is the cable/broadcast medium distinguishable, for
first amendment purposes, from the print media? A scarcity ration-
ale cannot provide the basis for distinction, since there is nothing
scarce about such a unified medium. Therefore, unless there are
other compelling justifications for specific regulatory controls-and
this article will argue that there are none-this unified medium
should enjoy the same first amendment status as newspapers.
The Supreme Court recently noted the increasing criticism of
spectrum scarcity as the prevailing rationale for broadcast regula-
tion. The Court further indicated that it might reconsider its long-
standing approach to regulation upon an appropriate signal that
1. See infra Section II (discussing the myth of scarcity).
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technological developments require a fresh perspective.2  Cable
sends such a signal. This article analyzes the nature of this signal by
first reviewing the errors that led to the emergence and adoption of
the scarcity rationale and then examining the current meaning of
scarcity. The precipitant demise of the scarcity rationale calls for
such a reexamination of scarcity principles from the current techno-
logical perspective. In this context, the new and rapidly developing
cable technology offers an easy resolution to the scarcity conun-
drum. Indeed, a proper reading of recent judicial opinions afford-
ing cable more first amendment protection by trying to distinguish
it from broadcasting in fact confirms the basic similarity between
these two media and presages the end of the doctrine of electronic
media scarcity.3
Finally, this article presents a number of specific examples of
difficulties with cable/broadcasting regulation that arise from assert-
ing distinctions between them. These problems can be eliminated
by treating cable and broadcasting as a unified medium. There is,
2. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n. 11 (1984). The Court
also suggested that it might reconsider the constitutional basis for the fairness doctrine,
id. at 378-79 n. 12, probably the single most inhibiting feature of current broadcast regu-
lation derived from the scarcity rationale. The FCC has sent its own signal in this re-
gard, relying in part on cable. See 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143
(1985), petition for review dismissed as to constitutional challenge but not otherwise, Radio-Televi-
sion News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Meredith
Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing FCC's response to
Supreme Court's invitation to send it a signal); Order Requesting Comment, 52 Fed.
Reg. 2,805 (Jan. 27, 1987) (in light of the 1985 Fairness Report, FCC requests comment
on whether enforcement of fairness doctrine is constitutional or is contrary to the public
interest); see also infra Section V.B (discussing the fairness doctrine).
3. Separate treatment is required for one line of cable cases in which cable is distin-
guished from broadcasting: the cases dealing with attempts to control so-called "inde-
cency" on cable. See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp.
1099 (D. Utah 1985), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986),
appeal docketed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3514 (U.S.Jan. 5, 1987) (No. 86-1125); Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F.
Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 755 F.2d 1415 (1 lth Cir. 1985); Community Television
of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office v. Wilkin-
son, 531 F. Supp. 986 (D. Utah 1982). Since regulation of broadcast indecency-upheld
by the Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 727 (1978)-is thought,
somewhat incorrectly, to rest on considerations that do not invoke a scarcity rationale,
these cable cases, which differentiate cable from broadcasting to avoid the reach of
Pacifica, raise concerns rather different from those that are the focus of this article. In a
companion article I explore the indecency issue and show that the asserted distinctions
between cable and broadcasting in that context are basically wrong, outmoded, and
largely unnecessary. Since they also conflict with the beneficial 'approach developed
here of treating cable and broadcasting as a unified medium, the reasoning of the cable
indecency cases should be discarded. Their correct result of no censorship, however,
should be retained. See Winer, The Signal Cable Sends-Part II: Inteiference From the Inde-
cency Cases?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. __ (forthcoming Mar. 1987).
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therefore, a profound symbiosis between cable and broadcasting in
which each supports full first amendment freedom for the other.4
II. THE MYTH OF SCARCITY
Scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum as a justification for
plenary federal regulation of the broadcast medium developed
through a series of legislative and judicial failings. At least initially,
the first amendment implications of such regulation were not well
recognized. Moreover, a misunderstanding of the physical nature of
the broadcast medium fostered the erroneous notion of scarcity
when, in fact, there is not and never has been a true lack of broad-
cast frequencies.5 The potential irrelevance of the scarcity rationale,
however, requires a review of the meaning of broadcast scarcity,
which is explored in this section. The next section will then analyze
whether cable now robs that concept of any vestigial meaning.
A. The Early Years of Broadcast Regulation-Interference and Scarcity
The Radio Act of 19126 was Congress' first general attempt7 to
regulate the early radio industry. It mandated the licensing of radio
stations, allocated certain frequencies for government use, adopted
some anti-interference measures, and established disaster signal
procedures. This Act, however, failed to set aside any particular fre-
quencies for the use of private broadcasters. After the development
in the early 1920s of the first standard broadcast stations, the de-
mand for broadcast licenses grew dramatically.8 When Herbert
4. Disputes between cable and broadcast interests arising from their economic
competition, such as the current controversy over the cable "must-carry" rules (i.e.,
cable's obligation to carry certain broadcast signals), unfortunately sometimes distort
their otherwise common first amendment interests. See, e.g., Countdown on Must-Carry,
BROADCASTING, Feb. 3, 1986, at 30, 31; Roper, Rethinking the Strategies of Must-Carry Regu-
lation, BROADCASTING, Oct. 21, 1985, at 20. For a discussion of the must-carry rules, see
infra Section III.B.
5. "The 'scarcity' that exists and that for 60 years has resulted in a tightly regulated,
politicized, oligopolistic, and indeed trashy system of broadcasting is the result of regu-
latory policies adopted by political decision makers, not a result of technological con-
straints to which the decision makers thought they were responding." Pool, Comment, in
UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES 173 (R.W. Poole, Jr., ed. 1985). See infra notes 95-109 and
accompanying text.
6. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912), repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch.
169, 44 Stat. 1162, 1174 (1927).
7. The 1912 Act had been preceded by the Wireless Ship Act of 1910, ch. 379, 36
Stat. 629 (1910), a maritime safety measure mandating shipboard radio equipment.
8. There were two stations on the air and about 400,000 receivers in 1921, 300
stations and over 2,000,000 receivers a year later, and more than 500 stations by 1925.
E. FOSTER, UNDERSTANDING BROADCASTING 67-68 (2d ed. 1982).
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Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce, attempted to assign frequencies
and regulate the burgeoning industry, he was stymied by court rul-
ings. For example, Hoover could not refuse to grant a license to a
qualified applicant even though the new station would interfere with
existing ones.9 Furthermore, his power to restrict the frequency
and hours of a licensee's operation was doubtful."0 Hoover there-
fore abandoned his attempt to impose restrictions on broadcasters,
and pleaded, in vain, for self-regulation.
By 1926 hundreds of broadcasters were on the air across the
country. They operated at will, choosing their hours, frequency,
and power levels with little regard for interference with each
other." "The result was confusion and chaos. With everybody on
the air, nobody could be heard."'12 Faced with this chaos and pres-
sured by President Coolidge,' 3 Congress enacted the Radio Act of
1927.1' Given the consequences of Congress' prior failure to enact
9. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The court held that
"Congress intended to fully regulate the business of radio telegraphy" but that it did so
"without leaving it to the discretion of an executive officer." Id. at 1006. Since the court
held that the duty to issue a license was mandatory and not discretionary, the most Hoo-
ver could do in granting the license was to select a wavelength resulting in the least
possible interference. Id. at 1007. Indeed, the court ruled that in adopting the 1912 Act
Congress had accepted interference in operation and had therefore merely prescribed
regulations by which the interference could be minimized rather than prevented en-
tirely. Id. at 1005.
10. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). The court
indicated that while the defendant station had not violated the criminal provision of the
1912 Act, the station's actions had violated specific statutory regulations for which a fine
up to $100 could be imposed and for repeated violations of which the license could be
revoked. Id. at 618. Thus Hoover was not totally powerless.
A few months after the Zenith decision, however, Hoover requested an opinion from
the Attorney General defining the Secretary's powers and duties under the 1912 Act. 35
Op. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926). This opinion concluded that, while the 1912 Act required a
station to obtain a license before broadcasting and imposed a criminal penalty for failure
to do so, the Secretary of Commerce could not limit the duration of licenses and had no
general authority, apart from the regulations in the 1912 Act itself, to assign
wavelengths or fix the times or power at which stations could operate. Thus, a station
could "with impunity operate at hours and with powers other than those fixed in its
license" subject only to regulations of the Act and penalties for malicious interference.
Id. at 131-32.
11. See S. HEAD & C. STERLING, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 139-40 (4th ed. 1982).
For example, Los Angeles and Chicago had, respectively, 23 and 40 stations operating
over limited spectrum space which, with the equipment then available, could accommo-
date only seven stations without resort to time sharing. C. STERLING &J. KIITROSS, STAY
TUNED: A CONCISE HISTORY OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 66 (1978).
12. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943) [hereinaf-
ter NBC].
13. See H.R. Doc. No. 483, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1926).
14. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
48 Stat. 1064, 1102 (1934).
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meaningful legislation, it is not surprising that Congress now re-
acted with plenary legislation. Indeed, although the main problems
needing attention were technical in nature-including a registration
system to establish frequencies, power, and hours of operation in
order to eliminate interference-the 1927 Radio Act initiated com-
prehensive regulation of the fledgling radio industry.' 5
The overriding feature of the 1927 Act was its clear implication
that ownership of the electromagnetic spectrum rests with the pub-
lic.16 As a corollary, the 1927 Act established the vague notion of
the "public-interest, convenience or necessity," or some permuta-
tion thereof, as the standard by which regulation was to be mea-
sured.' 7 On this conceptual basis the 1927 Act created the Federal
15. This legislative overkill was presaged by President Coolidge who, in his 1926
appeal to Congress, sought legislation not only to "protect radio listeners from interfer-
ence," but also to promote radio in the public interest by entrusting to a government
agency the "important functions of deciding who shall exercise the privilege of radio
transmission and under what conditions." H.R. Doc. No. 483, supra note 13, at 10 (empha-
sis added). Broadcasters themselves apparently favored federal regulation of the indus-
try as a public utility. See G. ARCHER, HISTORY OF RADIO TO 1926 at 248-50 (1938).
16. The 1927 Act precluded private ownership of radio frequencies, instituting in-
stead a system of government licenses limited in duration with no automatic renewal and
no vested right to continued use of the license or the frequency it represented. Radio
Act of 1927, ch. 169, §§ 1, 5(H), 9, 11(A), 39, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). Public ownership of
the airways, however, was by no means an a priori matter. In fact, prior to the 1927 Act,
at least one court, in an early interference case of first impression, recognized common-
law private property rights in the use of a particular radio frequency. The Tribune Co.
v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. 1926), reprinted in 68
CONG. REC. 216 (1926).
Moreover, in many respects the scheme of public ownership of the airways, with
private use thereof simply a privilege to be granted by the government conditioned
upon compliance with government regulation, may have been the fundamental mistake
that adversely affected the entire subsequent development of broadcast regulation. One
can argue that it is as fundamental a mistake as would be a similar scheme of govern-
ment licensing and regulation of newspapers. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148-49 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment)
[hereinafter CBS v. DNC]. For a critique of the very concept of public "ownership" of
the airwaves, see Winer, supra note 3.
17. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §§ 4, 4(F), 9, 11, 21, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). The
origins of this phrase have been attributed to a young lawyer for the Interstate Com-
merce Commission who was working for the Senate when the 1927 Act was being
drafted and who borrowed the phrase from the Interstate Commerce Act to overcome
an impasse among the drafters in defining a regulatory standard. N. MINOW, EQUAL
TIME: THE PRIVATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 8-9 (1964). The fact that a
standard for regulating commercial matters such as railroads and grain elevators, see B.
SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS V. PUBLIC ACCESS 137 (1976), could have been consid-
ered appropriate for an industry now recognized as entitled to substantial first amend-
ment protection indicates both the generally narrow scope of the first amendment in the
early twentieth century, see generally Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205 (1983); Rabban, The First Amendment In Its Forgotten 'ears, 90
YALE L.J. 514 (1981), and, more particularly, the lack of thought given to the amend-
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Radio Commission (FRC or Radio Commission), the precursor of
today's Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion), to effect licensing and regulatory functions.
Despite the relative success of the 1927 Act in rectifying the
previous chaos, President Roosevelt asked Congress a few years
later to reorganize and consolidate federal regulation of the com-
munications field.' 8 Congress responded by passing the Communi-
cations Act of 1934," 9 creating the FCC to replace the FRC and
incorporating wholesale the Radio Act of 1927 as Title 111.20 Despite
tremendous advances in communications technologies and a vastly
expanded first amendment jurisprudence, this basic structure of
public ownership of the airwaves, with a licensing system for private
use and federal regulation based upon the public interest standard,
has governed radio and later television broadcasting 2' since 1927.
B. Initial Development and Approval of the Scarcity Rationale
Almost immediately after Congress established the basic licens-
ing scheme governed by the public interest standard, the FRC, and
ment's application to the newly-developing technology. See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 54-55 (1962) (commenting on the content of the phrase in
different regulatory settings); see also Nadel, A Unified Theory of the First Amendment: Divorc-
ing the Medium From the Message, 11 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 163, 205-06 n.169 (1982) (noting
the difficulty in giving concrete meaning to the phrase). Compare A. RAND, CAPITALISM:
THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 123, 126 (1967):
Since there is no such thing as the "public interest" (other than the sum of the
individual interests of individual citizens), since that collectivist catch-phrase
has never been and can never be defined, it amounted to a blank check on
totalitarian power over the broadcasting industry, granted to whatever bureau-
crats happened to be appointed to the Commission.
18. See S. HEAD & C. STERLING, supra note 11, at 408; C. STERLING & J. KrrrROSS,
supra note 11, at 187-88. Roosevelt's message to Congress referred to communications
as one of those "utilities," the others being transportation and power, each of which
should have its own agency. S. Doc. No. 144, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
19. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610
(1982)).
20. Since the 1934 Communications Act also governs communications common car-
riers such as the telephone industry under Title II, the Act is careful to specify that "a
person engaged in radio broadcasting should not, insofar as such person is so engaged,
be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982). The Act's circular definition
of a "common carrier," id., has been given meaning by courts and the Commission. See
Cox Cable Communications, Inc., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1235, 1242-43 (1985), vacated
as moot, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 967 (1986); C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE
TELEVISION LAW 6.03 (1985) [hereinafter CABLE TELEVISION LAW].
21. The 1934 Communications Act defined "radio communication" broadly enough
to include television: "the transmission by radio of writing, signs, and signals, pictures
and sounds of all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus and services
(among other things, the receipt, forwarding and delivery of communications) incidental
to such transmission." 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982).
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later the FCC, began to develop and rely upon a scarcity rationale to
support a wide variety of regulatory controls. Lacking meaningful
guidance from Congress, the FRC set forth its interpretation of the
public interest standard in 1928.22 While some of the principles
outlined by the Radio Commission involved technical matters such
as optimum broadcast reception, freedom from interference, loca-
tion of a station's transmitter, and the like, it is clear that from the
beginning the FRC interpreted its mandate as governing program
content as well. For example, the FRC required "a fair distribution
of different types of service" and avoidance of "too much duplica-
tion of programs and types of program" and of "direct advertising,
including the quoting of merchandise prices. '"23 The Radio Com-
mission explicitly invoked an incipient scarcity rationale, referring
to "the paucity of channels," "the limited facilities for broadcast-
ing," and the fact that "the number of persons desiring to broadcast
is far greater than can be accommodated, "24 tojustify its paternalis-
tic determination of the best type of service for the listening public,
rather than letting the public itself determine this through its dis-
criminating support for various stations.
The FRC quickly applied its newly assumed power in several
cases, choosing among competing license applicants based on pro-
gramming considerations. 25 It also denied license renewals to one
station that was used to diagnose and treat over the air listeners'
medical ailments, 26 and to another owned by a church whose minis-
22. Statement by the Commission Relative to Public Interest, Convenience or Neces-
sity, 2 FRC ANN. REP. 166 (1928) [hereinafter Statement by Commission Relative to
Public Interest]. The FRC stated its conviction that the interest of the broadcast listener
was more important than that of the broadcaster and referred to the "trust imposed by
the license" on the broadcaster. Id. at 167, 169. While the FRC acknowledged claims
that the 1927 Act was unconstitutional due to the uncertainty and indefiniteness of the
public interest phrase, id. at 167, it likened the phrase to those of other federal statutes,
such as "unfair methods of competition," and left to future Supreme Court decisions the
task of giving specific meaning to the standard, id.; see, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcast-
ing Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940); cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F.
Supp. 404, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[D]efendant's attack on § 2 of the Sherman Act as
void for vagueness on its face would rewrite nearly a century of history, solid precedent,
and scholarship"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980).
23. Statement by Commission Relative to Public Interest, supra note 22, at 168. To
illustrate, the Radio Commission indicated that a station that played mainly phonograph
records in a community in which the records themselves were readily available to the
public might not be best serving the public interest. Id.
24. Id. at 168, 170.
25. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 FRC ANN. REP. 32 (1929), modified on other
grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
26. KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
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ter broadcast objectionable and allegedly defamatory attacks on
other religions and purportedly attempted to influence pending
court cases.2 7 In each case the FRC's authority to regulate, even as
to program content, was based implicitly or explicitly on the sup-
posed scarcity of broadcast resources. 28 None of these cases reached
the Supreme Court. Any one of them, however-especially the last,
involving offensive programming-would have presented squarely
for resolution the meaning and application of a scarcity rationale in
the context of the first amendment implications of content control
regulation. At this early stage, the Court might have produced an
opinion critical of the scarcity rationale at least as a basis for content
regulation. 29 The Court, however, did not consider the issue until
1943.30 It did so then only in a cursory manner and in the wrong
case.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States (NBC) " involved a chal-
lenge by NBC to "chain broadcasting ' 32 regulations promulgated
by the FCC in 1941. The Commission, concerned about the domi-
nance of the major networks over their affiliated local stations, pro-
scribed certain specified business relationships between licensees
and the networks. 3 While some of these regulations might have
27. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. de-
nied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
28. In Great Lakes, 3 FRC ANN. REP. at 34, the Radio Commission referred to the
problem of more broadcast speakers than can be accommodated; in KFKB, 47 F.2d at
672, the court cited the limited number of available broadcast frequencies as the reason
the Radio Commission should consider program content in a license renewal case; and
in Trinity Methodist, 62 F.2d at 852, the court referred to the limited facilities of broad-
casting as justifying regulation.
29. The D.C. Circuit Court in Trinity Methodist, however, considered and rejected a
first amendment challenge to the FRC's actions.
30. However, for an early case citing frequency scarcity as the basis for a government
licensing and allocation function, see FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 279, 282 (1933).
31. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
32. "Chain broadcasting," formally defined as the "simultaneous broadcasting of an
identical program by two or more connected stations," 47 U.S.C. § 15 3 (p) (1982),
meant simply the network system of program distribution whereby programs were trans-
mitted by wire--e.g., by leased telephone lines-from their point of origin to each affili-
ated station in the network for simultaneous broadcast. NBC, 319 U.S. at 194 n.l.
33. The following regulations were the subject of the litigation: (i) Exclusive affilia-
tion of station-a station affiliated with one network no longer could agree not to broad-
cast the programs of another network; (ii) Territorial exclusivity-a network could not
bind itself to its affiliate not to sell programs to any other station in the same area; (iii)
Term of affiliation-the agreement between the network and affiliated station could not
provide for a period of affiliation longer than two years; (iv) Option time-network op-
tional time during which, upon notice, the network could require its affiliates to carry a
commercial program during certain designated hours was limited; (v) Right to reject
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had an indirect effect on nonbusiness aspects of a station's opera-
tion-such as program content-there was no direct effect.3 4 This,
therefore, was not a case involving the FCC's ability to regulate pro-
gram content consistently with the first amendment. Rather, in sub-
stance it was an antitrust case 35 from which Justice Frankfurter's far
too broad majority opinion 36 became a justification for general FCC
regulation of the broadcast media.
Justice Frankfurter began his analysis with an overview of the
development of radio regulation. From this he derived "certain ba-
sic facts about radio as a means of communication":
[I]ts facilities are limited; they are not available to all who
may wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not
large enough to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed
natural limitation upon the number of stations that can op-
erate without interfering with one another. Regulation of
radio was therefore as vital to its development as traffic
control was to the development of the automobile. 7
Here Justice Frankfurter mixed two concepts which, though related,
should have remained separate-namely, the perceived limited
number of available frequencies and the phenomenon of interfer-
ence. The threat of electromagnetic interference 38 requires regula-
programs-an affiliation agreement could not prevent or hinder an affiliate from re-
jecting any network programming as unsatisfactory, unsuitable or contrary to the public
interest; (vi) Network ownership of stations-network ownership of overlapping local
stations, or such ownership that would substantially restrain competition, was prohib-
ited; (vii) Control by networks of station rates-a network could not require an affiliate
to restrict in any way its rates for the sale of broadcast time for other than the network's
programs. 319 U.S. at 198-209.
34. The regulation requiring that a station retain a meaningful right to reject net-
work programs, see supra note 33 at (v), for example, preserved a station's ability to pre-
clude offensive programming. But nothing in the regulation would have affected a
station's right to show any particular kind of programming it desired.
35. See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 207, 218 (1982); Powe, Or of the [Broadcast] Press, 55 TEX. L. REV. 39, 45-46 (1976);
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television
Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 143-44 (1967).
36. Frankfurter's opinion was joined by only four other Justices. Justices Murphy
and Roberts dissented, and Justices Black and Rutledge took no part in the case. NBC,
319 U.S. at 227, 238.
37. Id. at 213. Frankfurter also quoted the Commission's Report on Chain Broad-
casting for the basic policy consideration underlying the regulations: "With the number
of radio channels limited by natural factors, the public interest demands that those who
are entrusted with the available channels shall make the fullest and most effective use of
them." Id. at 218.
38. For a description of radio wave interference, see S. HEAD & C. STERLING, supra
note 11, at 58-59; Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media
Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563, 574-75 (1976).
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tion of the airwaves, just as the threat of auto accidents requires
traffic control. But ultimately the question of interference is in-
dependent of whether or not spectrum space is scarce. Even if spec-
trum space were unlimited, interference problems would remain
and require regulation, though only of a technical nature. Scarcity,
on the other hand, might justify some resource-sharing regulation if
logically related to the scarcity problem. By combining the notions
of scarcity and interference, instead of considering them as distinct
and separate rationales for different kinds of regulation, Justice
Frankfurter inappropriately made the leap from necessary but lim-
ited technical regulation to a comprehensive scheme for govern-
ment control of broadcasting. In so doing, he avoided the need to
examine the bases for various elements of such control." As his
opinion demonstrates, he did this by an unnecessarily expansive
construction of the Communications Act followed by a curt dismis-
sal of the first amendment problems inherent in so broad a reading.
Section 303(i) of the 1934 Act specifically grants the FCC au-
thority to make special regulations applicable to radio stations en-
gaged in chain broadcasting.4" Therefore, all the Court needed to
do to decide the statutory question presented was to determine
whether that specific grant of power encompassed the business reg-
ulations at issue. Here the Court relied on legislative history to sup-
port extending the Commission's authority over chain broadcasting
beyond technical and engineering matters to include business rela-
tionships between the networks and their local affiliates. 4 '
But Frankfurter went far beyond this to consider the general
39. Compare Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal.
1986), in which the court considered an aspiring cable television operator's first amend-
ment challenge to a city's exclusive franchising arrangement and stressed the need for a
thorough analysis of the relationship between proposed regulation of cable and the
characteristics of the cable medium. "[A] particular characteristic of a given form of
expression can only justify government regulation aimed at addressing that particular
characteristic." Id. at 1474-75.
40. That section states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to
time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall-
(i) Have authority to make special regulations applicable to radio stations
engaged in chain broadcasting.
47 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982).
41. The majority's interpretation was disputed by the dissent. Compare NBC, 319 U.S.
at 220-21 (finding that the legislative history of § 303(i) provides the Commission with
broad power to regulate the business aspects of chain broadcasting) with id. at 233-36
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (finding that the legislative history of § 303(i) limits the Com-
mission's power in this area to the regulation of only technical and scientific matters).
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scope of the Act. Drawing upon the Act's basic public interest stan-
dard4" Justice Frankfurter wrote:
[W]e are asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traf-
fic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations
from interfering with each other. But the Act does not re-
strict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic.
It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining
the composition of that traffic. The facilities of radio are
not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use
them. Methods must be devised for choosing from among
the many who apply. And since Congress itself could not
do this, it committed the task to the Commission.
... The facilities of radio are limited and, therefore,
precious; they cannot be left to wasteful use without detri-
ment to the public interest .... The Commission's licens-
ing function cannot be discharged, therefore, merely by
finding that there are no technological objections to the
granting of a license. If the criterion of "public interest"
were limited to such matters, how could the Commission
choose between two applicants for the same facilities, each
of whom is financially and technically qualified to operate a
station? Since the very inception of federal regulation by
radio, comparative considerations as to the services to be
rendered have governed the application of the standard of
"public interest, convenience, or necessity."-43
Again Justice Frankfurter inappropriately mixed notions of in-
terference and scarcity. He made the remarkable assertion that the
FCC could determine the "composition" of what is carried on the
airwaves without stating what this power encompassed or whether
this power derived from interference problems or scarcity. In fact,
the content of what is broadcast cannot affect interference, and the
42. Frankfurter also relied upon the Commission's mandate under 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(g) to "[s]tudy new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies,
and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public inter-
est," and its charge under § 307(b) to "provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribu-
tion of radio service" among the states and communities. NBC, 319 U.S. at 215-18. It is
difficult, however, to agree with Frankfurter's construction, id. at 217-18, of the encour-
agement in § 303(g) to technological development of radio as relating to program con-
tent and a role for the Commission in determining if a community is receiving "good"
radio service. Cf. id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (Commission's role more limited).
43. 319 U.S. at 215-17. Cf. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475
(1940) ("[T]he [Communications] Act does not essay to regulate the business of the
licensee. The Commission is given no supervisory control of the programs, of business
management or of policy.").
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Court offered no analysis of what elements of the airwaves' compo-
sition should be affected by scarcity. The Court's sole attempt to
justify comprehensive broadcast regulation by a scarcity rationale
was the assertion that the airwaves are "limited and therefore pre-
cious" and should not be left to "wasteful use."
Even assuming scarcity, the Court should have analogized the
frequency allocation function, necessary to prevent interference, to
a well-established model for private use of potentially valuable but
ownerless resources needing productive development.44 Land is
the ultimate scarce resource; no one is making more of it. Under
the Homestead Act of 1862"5 the government acted as custodian of
land in the public domain and defined objective and impartial rules
by which individuals could use and acquire it. Among the rules were
some requiring productive development of the unused land por-
tions over a period of time. With such a system, once the initial
investment is made, freely transferrable property rights attach to the
resources and the marketplace insures that they are put to contin-
ued optimal benefit.46
As with land, frequencies on the electromagnetic spectrum47
44. The Court's failure to make this analogy, even at a policy level, is perhaps under-
standable given the Communication Act's basic scheme of government ownership and
licensing of frequencies on a comparative merit basis. But the potentially adverse first
amendment implications of the legislative scheme should have been more worrisome to
the Court.
45. Ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862). See generally 1 AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION 3
(I. Sloan ed. 1976).
46. See Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw & ECON. 1, 14 (1959).
See also Fowler & Brenner, supra note 35, at 211-12 (discussing Coase's marketplace ap-
proach to the electromagnetic spectrum). Such a system has the salutary effect of creat-
ing appropriate market incentives and rewarding the pioneers who do all the work and
take all the risk in developing the resources. See generally B. ROBBINS, A STUDY OF PIO-
NEER AM RADIO STATIONS AND PIONEER TELEVISION STATIONS (197 1), reprinted in record
at app. 694-712, FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978).
47. The concept of private property rights in the spectrum and the analogy to dispo-
sition of public land is developed in Coase, supra note 46, at 14, and R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 39-41, 633-35 (3d ed. 1986). See also B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 90-92, 102-08 (1975); B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 133-35.
Professor Harry Kalven in 1967, after 40 years of the present regulatory structure, char-
acterized the Coase analysis as "an insight more fundamental than we can use." Kalven,
Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10J. LAw & ECON. 15, 30 (1967). On the
other hand, for an interdisciplinary study of the feasibility both of a system of private
property rights in the electromagnetic spectrum that will permit market exchanges to
take place and of a means of transition from the present administrative system to a mar-
ket one, see DeVany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara & Scott, A Property System for Market Alloca-
tion of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV.
1499 (1969). See also M. MUELLER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN RADIO COMMUNICATION: THE
KEY TO THE REFORM OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION (Cato Institute Policy Analy-
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could be assigned initially by lottery, with the user of a frequency
held to an appropriate, objective test of its productive use-for ex-
ample, the broadcast of a technically adequate signal, regardless of
content, at a specified power for a required minimum number of
hours per day or week. Thus, there were alternatives to Justice
Frankfurter's assumed need for the FCC to make programming-
based distinctions between competing licensees.4" These alterna-
tives would have allowed the public interest in broadcasting to be
measured by the entity best suited to do so-namely, the public it-
self acting through the marketplace, rather than by standards im-
posed by a federal administrative agency.4 9  Even without
subscribing wholly to the merits of a marketplace approach or re-
writing the Communications Act, the Court should have recognized
that government determination of what constitutes "wasteful use"
of a broadcast frequency necessarily implies a value judgment on
the content of what is broadcast. Under the first amendment such a
judgment is as inappropriate for broadcasting as it is for newspa-
pers,5 ° at least without demonstrating a compelling necessity based
on meaningful distinctions between the media.
Instead, the Court compounded its expansive statutory analysis
by the short shrift it gave to the first amendment implications, raised
sis No. 11, 1982); Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio
Frequency Allocation, 18J. LAW & EcON. 221 (1975).
48. In 1981 Congress finally allowed the Commission to choose among otherwise
qualified competing applicants for initial licenses by a system of basically random selec-
tion. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Title XII, Subtitle
B, ch. 2, § 1242, 95 Stat. 357, 736 (1981) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1982)). The
Commission since has applied a lottery selection process to several new electronic me-
dia. See, e.g., MMDS Lottery Order, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 943 (1985), aff'd sub nom.
Pappas v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Cellular Lottery Decision, 98 F.C.C.2d
175 (1984), reconsid., 101 F.C.C.2d 577, further reconsid., 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 407
(1985); Random Selection Lotteries, 93 F.C.C.2d 952 (1983) (low power television,
among others).
49. Cf. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (affirming, as consistent
with the Communications Act of 1934, an FCC Policy Statement relying on market
forces to promote diversity in broadcasters' entertainment formats and thereby to serve
the public interest).
50. The dissent in NBC essentially recognized this point by stating that the FCC was
seeking to:
greatly enlarge its control over an institution that has now become a rival of the
press and pulpit as a purveyor of news and entertainment and a medium of
public discussion. To assume a function and responsibility of such wide reach
and importance in the life of the nation, as a mere incident of its duty to pass on
individual applications for permission to operate a radio station and use a spe-
cific wave length, is an assumption of authority to which I am not willing to lend
my assent.
NBC, 319 U.S. at 232 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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by the networks, of broad government regulation of the broadcast
medium. In a single paragraph Justice Frankfurter simply reiterated
the limited nature of radio facilities-radio's "unique characteris-
tic"S '-as a justification for government regulation without any
analysis of the nature or scope of such regulation.5 2 Rather, he im-
plied that FCC action does not violate the first amendment if such
action is valid under the public interest standard of the 1934 Act.53
Thus, the Court defined and affirmed the scarcity rationale for
comprehensive government regulation of broadcasting in an inap-
51. "Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That
is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is sub-
ject to governmental regulation." Id. at 226.
52. Cf Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("First Amendment
complaints against FCC regulation of content are not adequately answered by mere reci-
tation of the technically imposed necessity for some regulation of broadcasting and the
conclusory propositions that 'the public owns the airwaves' and that a broadcast license
is a 'revocable privilege.' ") (emphasis in original), cert. denied sub nom. American Broad-
casting Cos. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
53. Frankfurter's exaltation of statutory authority over constitutional interests and
the paucity of his first amendment analysis led Professor Kalven to comment that, "The
passage catches a great judge at an unimpressive moment." Kalven, supra note 47, at 43.
Frankfurter's approach, however, likely was determined by his faith in federal regulatory
agencies on the one hand and his restrictive view of first amendment rights on the other.
Frankfurter, after all, held an endowed chair in administrative law at Harvard Law
School and relished teaching courses in public utilities and administrative law, areas in
which he developed expertise. See H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 132-
33 (1981);J. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 15, 36 (1975); M. PARRISH,
FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES 160 (1982). He also was a well-known, ardent sup-
porter of New Deal legislation, a centerpiece of which was reliance upon regulatory au-
thorities to supervise economic enterprises and curb many of the excesses of the
Depression era. See generally H. HIRSCH, supra, at 99-126; M. PARRISH, supra, at 220-51.
Just three years prior to NBC, Frankfurter wrote for a unanimous Court which was
"called upon to ascertain and enforce the spheres of authority which Congress has given
to the Commission [FCC] and the courts, respectively" in the 1934 Communications
Act. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 136 (1940). This opinion has
been described as
an essay in praise of the flexibility and expertise of administrative law and a
warning against assuming that the technicalities of the common law will con-
tinue to apply to this important new development. It was a warning also that
courts were to play a modest role in reviewing agency procedures and
decisions.
Kalven, supra note 47, at 38.
With regard to the first amendment, a few years after NBC Frankfurter criticized the
notion of a preferred constitutional position for freedom of speech. See Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This long-held view con-
tinued to color his first amendment opinions. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 521-23 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). More than his colleagues, Frankfurter
remained tenaciously reluctant to invoke the first amendment to invalidate government
authority. Compare Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding
state law requiring flag salute by school children; opinion for Court by Frankfurter) with
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (overruling Gobi-
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propriate case, addressing unnecessary matters with a confused ra-
tionale and inadequate first amendment analysis. Nonetheless, the
Court built on the early position of the FRC and FCC and sketched
two related notions of scarcity as justifications for broadcast regula-
tion. First, since the facilities of radio are limited and not available
to all who wish to use them, the Commission has a role in determin-
ing who should broadcast and in enforcing shared use of the spec-
trum. Second, again because broadcast facilities are limited, they
are precious and the public interest demands that they not be
"wasted." This means the Commission must ensure that they are
put to "good" use, and this criterion presumably applies to both the
determination of who receives a license and to the review of pro-
gramming services. The first concern focuses on the rights of the
public as potential speakers, and the second on the rights of the
public as listeners-two themes which, as we shall see, are interwo-
ven into the Court's scarcity analysis.
After this seminal case the Court did not return to a general
exposition of the rationale for government regulation of broadcast-
ing until Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC54 twenty-six years later. By
this time the pattern of extensive regulation was well entrenched.
Until very recently Red Lion and subsequent cases unquestioningly
affirmed the scarcity rationale and the regulation it supports.
C. Current Notions of Scarcity
Red Lion involved two cases55 challenging the FCC's contingent
access requirements under its personal attack and political editorial
rules, which are aspects of the more general fairness doctrine. 6
Although the Supreme Court upheld the rules and affirmed the con-
stitutionality of the doctrine,57 the Seventh Circuit's consideration
tis; dissent by Frankfurter). See generally P. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE
CONSTITUTION 75-107 (1971).
While the foregoing may explain Frankfurter's approach in NBC, it of course does
not ameliorate the deficiencies of his opinion.
54. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
55. Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir.
1968); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
56. For a description of the fairness doctrine and the Commission's rules, see infra
Sections V.B-C.
57. There is substantial evidence that, ironically, the Supreme Court's affirmance of
the fairness doctrine as an enhancement rather than an abridgment of first amendment
freedoms, Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375, in fact involved an incident in which the doctrine
was misused in an effort to stifle diversity of expression. See F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD
GuYs, THE BAD GuYs AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 35-54 (1975). But see F. COOK, MAVER-
ICK: FIFTY YEARS OF INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING 292-311 (1984).
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of one of two lower cases demonstrated that the errors of NBC need
not have been repeated. The Seventh Circuit read NBC as limited to
the issue of the validity of the chain broadcasting regulations, and
stated that the early case "does not support the Commission's posi-
tion that the broadcast press is not entitled to the same order of first
amendment protection as the printed press."58 Rather, the key is-
sue for the court was
whether the need for technical, financial and ownership
regulation of radio and television licensees sufficiently dis-
tinguishes this group from newspaper publishers so as to
warrant sustaining the imposition of burdens on radio and
television licensees which would be in flat violation of the
first amendment if applied to newspaper publishers.59
In unanimously setting aside the FCC's rules,60 the Seventh
Circuit dealt head-on with the scarcity issue. The court found gen-
eral circulation daily newspapers to be far scarcer than commercial
radio and television stations and rejected the argument that eco-
nomic and technological barriers to entry are significantly different
between the two media.6' The court also characterized the argu-
ment that public ownership of the airwaves transforms the licensees
into trustees for the public as "[l]ogically . . . meaningless. '"62
The Supreme Court's broad opinion, however, dashed
whatever hopes there were that, following the Seventh Circuit, a
modern Supreme Court would reexamine the scarcity doctrine as a
basis for general regulation of broadcasting. 3 The Court found au-
thority for the FCC's rules inherent in the public interest mandate
which the Court, citing NBC, reiterated to be a power "not niggardly
but expansive. "64
58. Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n, 400 F.2d at 1018 n.43.
59. Id. at 1018.
60. The court, however, was careful to distinguish the rules from the more general
fairness doctrine, id. at 1013, and was not prepared to hold the doctrine itself unconsti-
tutional, id. at 1017-18.
61. Id. at 1019. See infra notes 71 (statistics show that new entrants into the television
and radio industries have had no difficulty surviving in the industry) & 97 (a recent study
shows that economic barriers to entering the broadcasting industry are considerably
lower than those for the daily newspaper industry).
62. 400 F.2d at 1019. Here the court quoted from the article by former FCC Com-
missioner Robinson, supra note 35, at 152.
63. Justice White's opinion was for seven members of the Court. One seat was va-
cant and Justice Douglas did not participate. Later, however, Douglas noted his disa-
greement with the Court's opinion, CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 154 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in judgment), and Justice Stewart expressed his "considerable doubt" about
the opinion he had joined, id. at 138 (Stewart, J., concurring).
64. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
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Turning to the first amendment issues the Court began with the
broad assertion that differences in new media justify differences in
the first amendment standards applied to them.65 The Court first
discussed the problem of interference,66 which is irrelevant to fair-
ness doctrine issues. Having started down the same misguided path
as Justice Frankfurter in NBC, Justice White then lapsed into a scar-
city rationale: "When there are substantially more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to
posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast compa-
rable to the right of every individual to speak, write or publish."6 7
From this premise of scarcity the result upholding the rules in ques-
tion quickly but unpersuasively followed.
Untangling the Court's well-known but convoluted language
reveals the following logical progression in its argument:
(i) Since "[n]o one has a First Amendment right to a license...
as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed
stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused";
(ii) Therefore, the key first amendment interest at stake is that
of "the people as a whole [who] retain their interest in free speech
by radio and their collective right to have the medium function con-
sistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcast-
ers, which is paramount";
(iii) Then, since these ends and purposes are "to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail,"
(iv) "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences
which is crucial here";
(v) And, therefore, to achieve such ends, "IT]here is nothing in
the first amendment which prevents the Government from requiring
65. Id. at 386. This proposition is often repeated without noting that in Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), which the Red Lion Court relied on, the state-
ment that each new medium of communication "tends to present its own peculiar
problems" is immediately followed by the admonition: "But the basic principles of free-
dom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary." 343
U.S. at 503. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981); cf.
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (traditional first
amendment doctrine remains applicable), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Century
Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1470 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (application
to one medium of a lesser standard of first amendment protection is "an exception to
the rule that must be justified by a particular difference").
66. 396 U.S. at 387-88.
67. Id. at 388.
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a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself
as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airways. '"68
Thus the Court reasoned that the FCC was simply effecting an
"enforced sharing of a scarce resource" 69 through contingent access
requirements in much the same way as if it were simply allocating
frequencies among more people by assigning them for only a por-
tion of the broadcast day or week.
The scarcity rationale clearly was the crucial underpinning of
the Court's opinion. The Court approvingly cited congressional
recognition of the "factual predicate of scarcity" as the basis for reg-
ulation7 ° and took pains to argue that "[s]carcity is not entirely a
68. Id. at 389-90. The problems with this reasoning are manifold. First, the Court
assumes that the marketplace for competing views and voices is restricted to the air-
waves without considering the effect of all other mass communication media. Second,
the Court does not begin to explain why its argument, based on the need for diversity,
does not also support a system of government licensing and regulation of newspapers,
which are even more scarce in the meaningful sense in which the Court discusses scar-
city. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. Third, the Court posits that there are
representative views and voices that by necessity are otherwise barred from the airwaves.
Given the number and diversity of broadcast outlets compared, for example, with daily
newspapers, see infra notes 71 & 97, this proposition is highly dubious, particularly in the
absence of any supporting empirical data. Moreover, the Court dismisses the possibility
that any blandness and lack of diversity that may pervade the airwaves might be fostered
in large part by ubiquitous government regulation such as the fairness doctrine. 395
U.S. at 393; cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (dis-
cussing dangers inherent in applying compulsory access to newspapers). See also
Abrams, In Defense of Tornillo, 86 YALE LJ. 361, 364 n.30 (1976) (finding Red Lion and
Tornillo "utterly irreconcilable"). Finally, the Court fails to consider the arguably more
severe impingement on individual autonomy and editorial discretion resulting from a
fairness doctrine scheme, as opposed to one that divides the spectrum into smaller
pieces but then protects more fully a licensee's control over its own piece. In short, the
Court seems to have fallen into the trap of which Justice Stewart warned in the next
major case dealing with broadcast regulation when he described "the dangers that beset
us when we lose sight of the First Amendment itself, and march forth in blind pursuit of
its 'values.' " CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 145 (Stewart, J., concurring).
69. 395 U.S. at 391.
70. Id. at 399 n.26. In the same footnote the Court quoted with favor from a Senate
report:
"If the number of radio and television stations were not limited by available
frequencies, the committee would have no hesitation in removing completely
the present provision regarding equal time [i.e., 47 U.S.C. § 315] and urge the
right of each broadcaster to follow his own conscience.... However, broadcast
frequencies are limited and, therefore, they have been necessarily considered a
public trust."
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2564, 2571).
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thing of the past. "71 But now the Court emphasized that the impor-
tance of scarcity, as a predicate for regulation, is its assumed threat
to a suitable diversity of expression on the airwaves-such diversity
being a fundamental first amendment right of the public. Diversity,
then, became a chief "good" use of broadcasting which the Com-
mission could promote by suitable regulation.
71. 395 U.S. at 396. The Court also indicated in a single paragraph that, regardless
of gaps in spectrum utilization, and even assuming the possibility of new entry by com-
peting stations, the government could act in the public interest to assure diversity of
programming. Id. at 400. This is because, in the Court's view, existing broadcasters are
entrenched in dominant positions in the industry as a result of "[I]ong experience in
broadcasting, confirmed habits of listeners and viewers, network affiliation, and other
advantages in program procurement" and, therefore, enjoy substantial advantages over
any new entrants. Id. Since these advantages are the "fruit of a preferred position con-
ferred by the Government" in the initial license, id., the government may ensure that a
broadcaster's programming serves the public interest.
Again, however, the Court's reasoning is opaque at best. Presumably the point is
that even if new entrants are technologically possible, economically they would not be
able to compete against improperly entrenched elements of the industry and, therefore,
cannot be relied upon to foster diversity in programming. But this is a non sequitur. If
because of government policies and actions certain segments of the broadcast industry
enjoy an unwarranted competitive advantage, the solution is to redress the competitive
balance through antitrust types of remedies. Any problem of competition, however, in
no way relates to content control over broadcasters' programming-with respect to di-
versity of programming or otherwise. Nor are the first amendment implications of such
control lessened by the antitrust aspect.
Moreover, it would be rather ironic for the government to argue that its selective
granting of licenses, which is largely responsible for whatever spectrum scarcity exists,
see infra note 102, now somehow justifies even further programming regulation. Indeed,
a lottery system of allocating frequencies would avoid the Court's argument and illus-
trates its fallacy even under the present system. Any preferred position enjoyed by some
broadcasters is not the fruit of something conferred on them by the government. The
initial license was necessary, of course, but the preferred position is the result of what
the broadcaster earned in the marketplace presumably by satisfying the real public inter-
est. Successful broadcasters in this regard are no different from successful businesses in
other industries.
Finally, the Court was simply wrong in its economics. Statistics as to growth and
earnings in the television and radio industries since 1946 indicate that new entrants, by
and large, have had no difficulty surviving, competing, and even thriving despite the
supposed advantages of the established industry. See TELEVISION DIGEST, INC., TELEVI-
SION & CABLE FACrBOOK, CABLE & SERVICES VOL. at A6-A7, A-17 (1986). In particular,
since the Red Lion decision there has been a 48% increase in the number of all radio
stations and a 113% increase in the FM service. 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra
note 2, at 202. For television, the corresponding figures are an overall 44.3% increase,
13.3% increase in VHF stations, and 113% increase in UHF stations. Id. at 204. And
independent (i.e., non-network affiliated) television stations have recently doubled in
number and captured an increasingly significant portion of the market in most large
cities. Hayes, Hot Independent TV Stations, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1985, at Dl, col. 2. In
marked contrast, since 1950 only four new daily newspapers appear to have successfully
entered competition with an existing daily, Wirth, infra note 97, at 2-3, perhaps partly
because readership and advertiser loyalty for daily newspapers is much stronger than is
audience and advertiser loyalty for broadcast stations, id. at 35-38.
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The Court, however, drew the line at mandatory affirmative ac-
cess rights to the broadcast media in Columbia Broadcasting System v.
Democratic National Committee (CBS v. DNC).72 In that case, two
groups sought to purchase broadcast time to present their views on
important public issues. When the broadcasters, who regularly ac-
cepted paid commercial advertisements, repeatedly denied them ac-
cess, the groups alleged violations of the fairness doctrine and
asserted a first amendment right of access.73 While the Commission
rejected these claims and upheld a broadcast licensee's right gener-
ally to refuse all editorial advertising,7" the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed on first amendment grounds.75
The Supreme Court76 now invoked the scarcity rationale to
support editorial control and discretion by licensees. Since under
Red Lion scarcity means "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable first
amendment right to broadcast, ' ' 77 those seeking access had an up-
72. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
73. Id. at 98-99. The first group sought to air several recorded one-minute radio
announcements urging immediate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. Busi-
ness Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
WTOP, an all-news radio station, repeatedly refused to sell air time to the business exec-
utives, relying on its general policy barring all editorial advertisements, buttressed by
the station's claim that such controversial subjects required a more in-depth analysis
than could be provided in the short "spot" announcements the group was proposing.
Id. at 647.
The other group, the Democratic National Committee (DNC), claimed more gener-
ally that in planning an extensive media campaign it confronted several obstacles to
direct self-expression on the broadcast media, including the refusal of some broadcast-
ers to sell it time for comment on controversial public issues and for the solicitation of
funds. Id. The DNC, therefore, sought a declaratory ruling from the Commission that a
broadcaster could not adopt a general policy of refusing to sell time to "responsible"
entities such as itself. Id.
74. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242, 245 (1970);
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 223-24 (1970).
75. 450 F.2d at 665. The court, however, applied circular reasoning. The court be-
lieved that the public's pre-eminent first amendment interests in radio and television
depended not so much on the scarcity rationale as on the state action feature of broad-
casting in this context. Id. at 649-51. Such state action, in turn, is premised mainly on
the pervasive regulatory relationship between broadcasters and the federal government,
id. at 651, which is then justified largely by the scarcity rationale. The court's difficulty
here was exposed when it alluded to the natural question of why the first amendment
values it purported to be advancing by giving the public some affirmative access rights to
the broadcast media do not mandate similar access rights to newspapers. The court's
answer was that broadcasting and newspapers are distinguishable in terms of state ac-
tion because of the lesser extent of government involvement in newspapers-which was
just another way of saying that the scarcity considerations that have been applied to
broadcasting have never been thought applicable to the print media. Id. at 651 n.17.
76. Five members of the Court formed a majority for the opinion except for that
portion (Part III) dealing with the state action issue.
77. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 101 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388).
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hill battle to overcome the right of broadcasters to exercise editorial
judgment.78 This they were unable to do, since the Court found the
Commission justified in relying on broadcaster editors, who are pe-
riodically accountable to the Commission, to fulfill their public in-
terest obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues. 79
In thus upholding the editorial freedom of broadcasters the
Court added an important qualification to its scarcity rationale anal-
ysis. Since this was an access case, the Court focused on the ability
of members of the public to air their viewpoints rather than on the
public's right to receive a suitable diversity of expression. In this
context the Court described scarcity as the unavailability of broad-
cast facilities to all those with the requisite financial resources.80
The Court thereby acknowledged that scarcity of the broadcast me-
dium must mean something beyond existing economic barriers to
entry, which are common to all media of communication; not every-
one who wants to publish a newspaper can do so. Scarcity thus
means a perceived, inherent physical limitation on the available
broadcasting facilities, and a limitation not shared by other media. 8 1
Indeed, the Court implicitly confirmed the uniqueness of
broadcast scarcity in deciding Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo
(Tornillo), 8 2 the print analogue to Red Lion. In the Fall of 1972 Pat
Tornillo was a very public and controversial figure in Dade County,
Florida, and a candidate for the state legislature. A few days prior to
a runoff election the Miami Herald published two scathing editorials
attacking Tornillo and opposing his candidacy. Tornillo invoked a
1913 Florida statute making it a misdemeanor for any newspaper
which assails the "personal character" or "official record" of any
political candidate to refuse to publish without charge any compara-
ble reply the candidate wished to make.83 When the Miami Herald
refused to print his reply, Tornillo sought damages and, just prior
to the election, a mandatory injunction requiring publication. The
state attorney general, however, declined to defend the statute and
the court dismissed the action with prejudice, finding the statute un-
78. Id. at 101, 111.
79. "For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and
choice of material." Id. at 124.
80. "All who possess the financial resources and the desire to communicate by televi-
sion or radio cannot be satisfactorily accommodated." Id. at 101.
81. Id.
82. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
83. The statute had been ignored until a few months prior to the Tornillo editorials
when, in a prosecution under the statute, a county judge had ruled that it was unconsti-
tutional. State v. News-Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp. 164 (1972).
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constitutional on its face under the first amendment.8 4
Tornillo then lost the election. The case, however, continued
as a test of the public's first amendment right of access to the media,
with Professor Jerome Barron, a leading advocate of that theory,8 5
as counsel for Tornillo. The Florida Supreme Court, taking a direct
appeal of the case, 6 held the statute constitutional notwithstanding
the attorney general's contrary argument; imposed a limiting con-
struction on the criminal statute in an attempt to cure its vagueness
and overbreadth; implied a civil cause of action and remedy (though
not an injunction) under the statute; and remanded the case to the
trial court.
8 7
Upon review, 8 the Supreme Court detailed the proponents' ar-
guments concerning the public's right of media access only to find
such arguments unavailing. These arguments centered on the
structure of the newspaper industry. When the first amendment was
enacted, a true marketplace of ideas existed. The press was broadly
representative of the public, entry into publishing was easy and in-
expensive, and there were meaningful alternatives to the conven-
84. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80, 82, 83 (1972). The
court also ruled the statute impermissibly vague. Id. at 83.
85. See, e.g., J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?-THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO MASS MEDIA (1973); Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 766
(1970); Barron,An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 487 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967).
86. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973) (per curiam).
Given the emergency nature of the proceedings below, the case went up on appeal bar-
ren of any record except for the complaint and the Dade County Circuit Court's final
judgment. So, for example, there was no record as to the chilling or other effect on a
newspaper from the right of reply statute.
The importance of the issue at stake, however, was clear. The Florida ACLU and
over a dozen media interests filed separate amicus briefs.
87. Id. At the time, the Florida Supreme Court was an elected court. Many of the
judges were embroiled in public controversies as to their integrity and competence, con-
troversies which the Miami Herald no doubt reported on in full. See Fisher, And Who Will
Take Care of the Damrons of the World?, in THE TRIAL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15-16
(Freedom of Information Center ed. 1975). The court stated its belief that the right of
reply statute "enhances rather than abridges freedom of speech and press" since it adds
to the flow of information and ideas and furthers the public's right to know all sides of a
controversy. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d at 80, 82.
88. Since the Florida Supreme Court had remanded the matter to the trial court,
Tornillo originally argued there was no appealable final judgment. Then, perhaps to
test the right of access theory, Tornillo reconsidered and urged the Supreme Court to
review the matter. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 246
(1974). The Court was not much bothered by the notion that the case was not yet ripe
for review since it would have been "intolerable to leave unanswered" such an impor-
tant first amendment issue affecting the freedom and operation of the press. Id. at 247
n.6.
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tional, organized press for the expression of unpopular opinions.
Today, the proponents argued, this structure has changed. The
communications revolution has produced a press dominated by big
businesses increasingly coming under common ownership. A pow-
erful, influential, noncompetitive, concentrated and homogeneous
press has arisen. 89 Moreover, new entry into the industry is no
longer an alternative since the same economic factors that produced
the current condition have created almost insurmountable barriers
to entry. This situation, they argued, and the public's first amend-
ment interest in a functioning marketplace of ideas, impose a fiduci-
ary obligation on the press which can be satisfied, in part, by the
type of access to the media required by the Florida statute. In other
words, economic scarcity in the print media justifies, on first amend-
ment principles, some level of government regulation just as physi-
cal scarcity of the broadcast spectrum supports government
regulation of broadcasting.
The Court, however, unanimously rejected these arguments. It
held that the government could not compel editors and publishers
to publish that which " 'reason' tells them should not be pub-
lished."9 But the Court never explained why scarcity based on eco-
nomic factors in the print media does not justify governmental
interference with editorial discretion when scarcity based on the
physical characteristics of broadcasting does.9 Indeed, in what re-
mains an enigma and an indefensible omission, the Court never
cited, let alone discussed, Red Lion.9"
In sum, then, the Court based its broadcast scarcity rationale on
89. Id. at 248-50.
90. Id. at 254 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n. 18 (1945)).
91. Cf. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam) [here-
inafter HBO v. FCC] ("[S]carcity which is the result solely of economic conditions is
apparently insufficient to justify even limited government intrusion into the First
Amendment rights of the conventional press."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). Despite
criticism of the broad and absolute nature of the Tornillo opinion, see, e.g., B. SCHMIDT,
supra note 17, at 229-35, the Court continues to rely on Tornillo in a way that reaffirms
the scope of its holding. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S.
Ct. 903 (1986).
92. The Court did not even cite its Red Lion shibboleth, see supra note 65 and accom-
panying text, that differences among media justify different first amendment treatment.
The incongruity of Red Lion and Tornillo, and the Tornillo Court's failure to deal with Red
Lion, have led to considerable comment and some attempts to reconcile the irreconcila-
ble. See, e.g., B. SCHMIDT, supra note 17; Abrams, In Defense of Tornillo, 86 YALE LJ. 361
(1976); Price, Taming Red Lion: The First Amendment and Structural Approaches to Media Regu-
lation, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 211 (1979); Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment:
Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C. L. REV. 539 (1978); Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo:
A Consistent Theory of Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1976).
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a perceived absolute-if not well-determined-physical limit on the
number of distinct, usable broadcast frequencies, a problem unique
to the spectrum.93 This results in two problems: first, that all those
who wish to broadcast, even though financially and otherwise capa-
ble, may not be able to do so; and second, that the public may not
be exposed to an adequate diversity of expression. To rectify these
perceived problems the Court has, on occasion, been willing to bal-
ance the first amendment rights of broadcasters with the asserted
rights of the public as speakers and listeners.
As we have seen, however, the Court's reasoning leaves much
to be desired. Yet perhaps the Court's greatest error has been its
failure to recognize that fundamentally all resources are scarce,94
newsprint as well as broadcast frequencies. People would like to use
more than they can. This basic economic fact of life is no justifica-
tion for pervasive government regulation, especially in an area im-
bued with significant first amendment concerns.95 It certainly is no
basis for regulating the broadcast media but not newspapers. 96 For
in any meaningful sense of scarcity, newspapers are far more scarce
than broadcast frequencies, 97 especially when many physically avail-
93. For cases after CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), that restate this concept of
broadcast scarcity, see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-78 (1984);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394-97 (1981) [hereinafter CBS v.
FCC]; FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795, 799-800
(1978). Cf. Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that distinguishing between the print and broadcast media on
the basis of the latter's physical scarcity is a "distinction without a difference" that "inev-
itably leads to strained reasoning and artificial results"). The Telecommunications Research
court, in discussing the Supreme Court's "classic formulation of the scarcity doctrine,"
emphasized that the Supreme Court's articulation of the doctrine "contains no hint" of
reliance on the immediacy or power of broadcasting, but is based "entirely on the physi-
cal scarcity of broadcasting frequencies." Id. at 507-08.
94. See Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2J. LAW & ECON. 1, 14 (1959).
A more economically sophisticated Commission appears to be successfully avoiding ap-
plication of a modern variant of the scarcity rationale in the regulation of transponders
on domestic communications satellites. See Wold Communications v. FCC, 735 F.2d
1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
95. Indeed, freedom of the press was established in the context of considerable
newspaper scarcity. Only 29 newspapers were publishing weekly, semiweekly, or tri-
weekly in the American colonies of 1770 and only 39 in 1780. Eight dailies and 83
weeklies were publishing by 1790. B. OWEN, supra note 47, at 64. The ensuing decades,
however, saw considerable growth in the number of dailies and weeklies. Id.
96. The "analytical confusion" inherent in the scarcity rationale for broadcast regu-
lation finally has been explicitly recognized in a remarkable opinion joined by Judge,
nowJustice, Scalia. Telecommunications Research, 801 F.2d at 508.
97. See CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 144 (Stewart, J., concurring). Defining "print me-
dia" as general interest, chiefly general circulation daily newspapers, and "electronic
media" as AM and FM radio and UHF and VHF television stations, a recent study for the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation demonstrates that, both
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able broadcast frequencies remain vacant.9 8 Furthermore, the
growing merger between print and broadcast media 99 illustrates the
futility of continuing to distinguish between the two with respect to
scarcity or ultimate first amendment status.' 0 0 Yet, as Tornillo dem-
numerically and in terms of concentration, scarcity lies not with the electronic media but
with the print media. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTA-
TION, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA: THE CASE FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT PARITY Sec. IV (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT].
In particular, while at the time of this study there were over 9,150 radio stations and
over 1,050 television stations, there were less than 1,800 daily newspapers. Id. at 63.
While newspapers still outnumber television stations in raw figures, only 2.5% of Ameri-
can cities with daily newspapers have more than one. Id. In contrast, as of September
1984, 64% of United States households could receive nine or more television broadcast
stations compared to only 8% percent in 1964. A.C. NIELSEN Co., NIELSEN REPORT ON
TELEVISION 2 (1985). When cable channels are included, 83% can receive nine or more
channels and 29% can receive 20 or more. Id. See also 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report,
supra note 2, at 204-05, 209-10. Thus, the trend toward extreme concentration in daily
newspapers is in marked contrast to the exponential growth in the percentages of cities
with multiple television channels. Moreover, a recent study shows that the economic
barriers to entering the broadcasting industry, both television and radio, are considera-
bly lower than those for the daily newspaper industry. See M. WIRTH, ECONOMIC BARRI-
ERS TO ENTRY: DAILY NEWSPAPERS vs. TELEVISION STATIONS VS. RADIO STATIONS: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS at ii (App. C., Comments of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, in re-
sponse to Notice of Inquiry in Gen. Docket No. 84-282, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317, 20,327
(1984) (1984 Fairness Doctrine Inquiry)) (available from Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters,
1771 N. St., N.W., Wash., D.C. 20036).
98. As of mid-1985 there were 54 vacant VHF channels (34 commercial and 20 non-
commercial) and 462 vacant UHF channels (109 commercial and 353 noncommercial).
1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 207. These vacancies occur in both large
and small markets with, for example, 32 commercial UHF vacancies in the top 50 mar-
kets. Id. While many of these vacant channels may not be profitable to operate, this is
an economic problem, not one of physical limitations. As for radio, the Commission
recently allocated 689 new FM channels and has streamlined its procedures to facilitate
processing and developing these new FM allotments as well as the already existing 152
vacant FM allotments. Id. at 203.
For a description of frequency vacancies a few years prior to Red Lion, see United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 n.40 (1968).
99. A number of newspapers such as USA Today and The Wall Street Journal are broad-
cast to various printing presses across the country before being delivered to readers on
newsprint. SENATE COMMITrEE PRINT, supra note 97, at 83; Garneau, Wall Street Journal
Now Fully Computerized, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 17, 1985, at 32. Similarly, teletext and
videotext (see infra note 190) transmit printed text such as newspapers either by broad-
cast or wire. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 97, at 83. See generally I. DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 39-42 (1983) (discussing convergence of print and
electronics).
100. See CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 148 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment) ("My
conclusion is that TV and radio stand in the same protected position under the first
amendment as do newspapers and magazines."). See also Transmission of Teletext by
TV Stations, 101 F.C.C.2d 827, 830-34 (1985) (Commission declined to apply its tradi-
tional broadcast content regulations to the print-related textual data transmission me-
dium of teletext since it believed users of teletext do not listen to or view it in the
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onstrates, regulation that is acceptable for broadcasting would be
anathema for the print media.
Moreover, even the concept of a unique, physical limitation on
the availability of broadcast frequencies is questionable. In recent
testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, Dr. Robert S. Powers, Chief Scientist of the FCC,
concluded that from a technological point of view there is no inher-
ent shortage of spectrum capacity-nor was there any fifty years
ago.' 0 ' Rather, growth in the usable spectrum has averaged over
twenty percent per year for the past sixty-five years. 102 While we
now may be approaching the end of the high frequency frontier of
virgin spectrum for terrestrial broadcasting as we know it, this does
not imply any fundamental shortage of spectrum for broadcast or
other uses. By using channels more efficiently,' decreasing chan-
nel size,'0 4 and implementing better geographical distribution of
stations 0 5 through the use of advanced mathematical techniques,1
0 6
broadcasting sense, but rather read it), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, and remanded, Telecommu-
nications Research, 801 F.2d 501.
101. Freedom of Expression Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 1917 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transportation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-43 (1984) (statement of Dr.
Robert S. Powers, Chief Scientist, FCC) [hereinafter Hearings on Freedom of Expression Act].
See also Fowler & Brenner, supra note 35, at 222-23 (arguing that "theoretically scarce"
airwaves can accommodate many additional channels).
102. Hearings on Freedom of Expression Act, supra note 101, at 34, 38, 41. Despite this
actual growth, however, the FCC's allocation policies for broadcast frequencies have
created artificial shortages. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 35, at 224-25. In a colloquy in
his testimony, for example, Dr. Powers stated that one unused UHF television frequency
in the Washington, D.C., area could be replaced by almost 100 new AM radio stations-
more, probably, than the market would support. Hearings on Freedom of Expression Act,
supra note 101, at 37. Cf. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 99, at 153 ("There could be a
thousand radio stations in every metropolitan area.").
103. See generally I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 99, at 152-54 (discussing methods for
multiplying channels available for electronic communication).
104. See 9 kHz Channel Spacing for AM Broadcasting, 88 F.C.C.2d 290 (1981), in
which the FCC rejected a proposal to increase the number of AM channels from 107 to
119 by reducing their bandwidth from 10 kHz to 9 kHz. The FCC rejected the proposal
because the conversion costs outweighed the benefits. For another view of this matter,
see I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 99, at 152. Pool contends that broadcasters objected
because they did not want more competitors.
105. See Modification of FM Broadcast Station Rules to Increase the Availability of
Commercial FM Broadcast Assignments, 94 F.C.C.2d 152 (1983) (changing FM allot-
ment structure to add 684 stations), reconsid., 97 F.C.C.2d 279 (1984); Addition of New
VHF Stations in the Top 100 Markets, 81 F.C.C.2d 233 (1980) (allocating new VHF
television assignments to four communities through short-spaced assignments), reconsid.,
90 F.C.C.2d 160 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Springfield Television of Utah v. FCC, 710 F.2d
620 (10th Cir. 1983). For additional discussion on geographical distribution of stations,
see 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 202-08, and the description of low
power television, infra note 185.
106. See Hearings on Freedom of Expression Act, supra note 101, at 34, 39-40.
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we have greatly increased the intensity of spectrum use. Such im-
provements in spectrum use naturally have associated costs,' 0 7 but
these are no different from similar costs which we have paid numer-
ous times in the past and should expect to pay in the future.' 0 8 Dr.
Powers therefore concluded that "the radio frequency spectrum
does not impose any fundamental limit to the potential for provid-
ing information and entertainment services to homes and business
establishments."10 9
Thus, from its inception, the scarcity rationale for regulation of
broadcasting was flawed on factual, legal, and policy grounds as well
as in its application. However the debate over the scarcity rationale
might have been resolved in a previous era, the advent of cable, as
the most prominent of the new electronic media, should put an end
to that misguided concept. Indeed, in CBS v. DNC the Court antici-
pated that the dynamic technological nature of the broadcast indus-
try, and the advent of cable, might in a few years make once-
acceptable regulation outmoded." 0 And in its most recent review
of the "fundamental principles that guide our evaluation of broad-
cast regulation,""' the Court added a remarkable footnote:
The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on
spectrum scarcity has come under increasing criticism in
recent years. Critics, including the incumbent chairman of
the F.C.C., charge that with the advent of cable and satel-
lite television technology, communities now have access to
such a wide variety of stations that the scarcity doctrine is
obsolete. We are not prepared, however, to reconsider our
long-standing approach without some signal from Con-
gress or the F.C.C. that technological developments have
advanced so far that some revision of the system of broad-
cast regulation may be required." 2
107. These include obsolescence of existing equipment, the need for expensive
equipment modifications, increased levels of interference, and some modifications of
signal characteristics including perceived signal quality. Id. at 40.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 42. See also 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 207 ("These
technological improvements combined with the number of vacant channels suggest that
there is sufficiently available spectrum to anticipate continued growth in the number of
television broadcast facilities.").
110. See CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 102, 131 (1973). Justice Douglas predicted cable's
potential for making scarcity "a constraint of the past." Id. at 158 n.8 (Douglas, J., con-
curring in judgment).
111. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984).
112. Id. at 376 n. 1I (citations omitted). Cf. Telecommunications Research and Action
Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (describing distinction between
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The Court did not indicate the nature of the signal it would
require for that revision, but it clearly implied that an appropriate
signal would raise substantial issues as to the scope of current
broadcast regulation." 3 Equally clear is that cable television, when
properly viewed as a reasonably comparable alternative to broadcast
television, sends just such a signal.
III. CABLE TELEVISION AND THE END OF BROADCAST SCARCITY
A. Background of Cable
Cable television is a system of communication which, at the
consumer level, relies upon wire rather than over-the-air broadcast-
ing for the transmission of signals." 4 The cable technology greatly
reduces interference both from external sources and among the var-
ious signals transmitted, thereby allowing the consumer to receive a
greater number of channels than broadcasting provides. Over sixty-
two percent of existing cable systems, accounting for over eighty-
eight percent of cable subscribers, have a channel capacity of twenty
or more, with forty-six percent of the systems (over seventy-two per-
cent of subscribers) having a capacity of thirty or more." 5 Modern
systems are being built with over one hundred channels, and older
systems are being upgraded to increase capacity. This great
proliferation of available cable channels is the main feature of cable
that solves what remains of the scarcity problem.
The cable operator must have a source for the signals transmit-
ted which may include audio/video signals or other data or elec-
tronic information."t 6 The operator's programming includes some
broadcast and print media as "a distinction without a difference," but stating that it was
not free to fashion new doctrine).
113. The Commission's 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, while focusing on the fairness
doctrine, may be intended as that signal: "[C]ourts may well be persuaded that the
transformation in the communications marketplace justifies the adoption of a standard
that accords the same degree of constitutional protection to broadcast journalists as
currently applies to journalists of other media." 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra
note 2, at 155.
114. See generally 1 CABLE TELEVISION LAW, supra note 20, at 5.02 (1983) (describing
the technical aspects of cable television); Ferris, The Development of Video Technology, in D.
RICE, M. BOTEIN, E. SAMUELS, DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION OF NEW COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES 9-12 (D. Rice, M. Botein, E. Samuels eds. 1980). Although the signal
travels along a cable, the same basic physical phenomenon-namely, electromagnetic
radiation-is involved as with aerial transmission of broadcast signals.
115. TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK, supra note 71, at A-45.
116. The focus here is on the comparison between cable and broadcast television in
the delivery of audio/video programming. See the definitions of "cable service," "other
programming service," and "video programming" in the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. III 1985).
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original material, but consists mainly of local or distant broadcast
signals picked up over the air by means of special antennas or
ground relay systems and retransmitted to customers. In other
cases, signals distributed over-the-air via satellites are received by a
parabolic dish antenna and retransmitted. Thus, while the con-
sumer sees only a wire coming into a television set, distribution is
actually dependent upon broadcasting over the electromagnetic
spectrum to the cable operator's source point or "headend" and
then along the cable via electromagnetic radiation to the subscriber.
Cable operators usually offer their subscribers a wide variety of
programming services, often with a number of channels sold to-
gether as a package or tier. For a monthly subscription fee, custom-
ers receive the basic tier-usually including local broadcast
stations1 17 (often with improved reception) and additional chan-
nels."' Beyond the basic tier a customer can purchase "pay
cable"-special channels for programming such as sports, children's
programming, feature movies, "adult" programs, and the like." 9
Where the necessary technology is available, some cable program-
mers offer pay-per-view service, by which a subscriber individually
orders and pays a fee to see a specific movie or other special
programming. ' 20
Cable operators generally also dedicate some of their channels
to certain leased or public access uses. For a number of years, for
example, many municipalities have required their franchised cable
operators to devote a minimum number of channels to "PEG" (pub-
lic, educational and governmental) uses and to have other channels
available for commercial leasing by the public. 12 The 1984 Cable
Communications Policy Act specifically permits a franchising au-
thority to require PEG access channels and allows full enforcement
117. See infra Section III.B (discussing the must-carry rules applicable to such signals).
118. See Cable Services Subscriber Count, CABLEVISION, Jan. 6, 1986, at 56 (listing various
cable services).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Competing Points of View on Pay Per View, BROADCASTING, June 10, 1985, at
73; Pay-per-view: On the Verge of Prominence, CABLEVISION, Nov. 4, 1985, at 24; Stevenson,
A Push for Pay-Per-View TV, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1985, at Dl, col. 2 (nat'l ed.).
121. Similar federal cable access requirements were struck down as beyond the FCC's
statutory jurisdiction in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978),
af'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video II). This was no bar to local access require-
ments, however. See generally 2 CABLE TELEVISION LAW, supra note 20, chs. 15, 15A (dis-
cussing access to cable systems). But see infra text accompanying notes 137-42.
Manhattan Cable TV in New York City, for example, has been used extensively for pub-
lic, educational, governmental, and leased access purposes. 2 CABLE TELEVISION LAW,
supra note 20, 15.06 & app. C at 449 (excerpts from MANHATTAN CABLE TV COMMU-
NITY PROGRAMMING HANDBOOK).
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of all such provisions in pre-existing franchise agreements.' 22 The
Act also mandates that, "to assure that the widest possible diversity
of information sources are made available to the public," a cable
operator must designate a proportional number of channels for
leased commercial use by unaffiliated persons. 23
Over the last decade, cable has quickly and successfully pene-
trated the marketplace, indicating its wide appeal to consumers.' 24
There are 7,300 operating cable systems nationwide serving 19,000
communities with another 1,000 franchises approved but not yet
built.' 25 As of mid-1985 cable had penetrated over forty-six percent
(39.9 million) of all television households in this country.' 26 Even
more significant is the percent of television households for which
cable is available if they choose to subscribe-almost seventy-five
percent as of January 1987.127 While competition from other new
video technologies 128 may cause the rate of growth to taper off,
there can be little doubt that a significant portion (and soon a ma-
jority) of homes in this country will be plugged into cable and al-
most all will have the option.' 29 And, as the FCC recently
concluded from the substantially higher cable penetration levels in
smaller broadcast markets, "there is a significant degree of sub-
stitutability between cable and over-the-air television
broadcasting."' 30
122. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 557 (Supp. III 1985).
123. Id. at § 532.
124. For a cable industry growth chart, see CABLEVISION, Jan. 5, 1987, at 62.
125. BROADCASTING PUBLICATIONS INC., BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING YEARBOOK
1986, at D-3 (1986).
126. In Brief, BROADCASTING, Dec. 16, 1985, at 144 (citing statistics from A.C. Nielsen
Co.). This represents a 5.7% gain over the previous year. Id.
127. CABLEVISION, Jan. 5, 1987, at 62.
128. See Smith, Home Box Office and Showlime Lose Subscribers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1985,
at 46, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
129. For estimates of cable's growth to 1990, see SENATE COMMITrEE PRINT, supra
note 97, at 80-81; CABLEVISION, Jan. 5, 1987, at 62.
130. 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 211. The Commission also re-
ferred to the "homogeneity" and "fungibility" between cable and broadcasting. Id. at
220. See also Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("From the perspective of the viewer, no doubt, cable and broadcast television appear
virtually indistinguishable."), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); G. WEBB, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 20-21 (1983) (discussing complementary-competitive relation-
ship of cable and broadcast television); Levy & Pitsch, Statistical Evidence of Substitutability
Among Video Delivery Systems, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETION 56 (E. Noam ed. 1985) (dis-
cussing statistical evidence that pay cable and broadcast television are substitutes).
In its recently released Must Carry Rules, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 792, 825, stay of
effective date, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1176 (1986), the Commission concluded: "[T]he
cable industry is now a full-fledged video service providing consumers with alternative
programming choices that are competitive with the services of broadcast stations."
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Cable, then, supplies an increasingly significant portion of the
American public with audio/video programming similar to broad-
cast television and offers a vastly expanded number of channels.
Thus, cable, as a substitute for broadcasting, apparently solves the
perceived physical scarcity problem underlying most broadcast reg-
ulation. With even modest cable systems offering a plethora of
channels and various opportunities for third-party access, it is diffi-
cult to argue that any kind of meaningful scarcity exists, either in
terms of a lack of diversity of programming or a lack of opportunity
for persons to present their views over the medium. There are,
however, some additional factors to consider.
B. Cable Carriage of Broadcast Signals
Until very recently the FCC's "must-carry" rules required that
cable systems carry all local and other "significantly viewed" broad-
cast signals, 131 thereby blurring any distinctions between the media.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, struck down the rules
as violating the first amendment rights of cable operators.' 3 2 Under
pressure from Congress, and after a compromise between major
cable and broadcast interests, the FCC has reimposed a much less
burdensome form of must-carry.' 33 Thus, cable operators may con-
tinue to carry broadcast stations either voluntarily, or pursuant to
the relaxed must-carry obligations, or under a commercial arrange-
ment with the broadcaster. 134 But the demise of the original must-
carry rules means that cable systems, many of which were signifi-
cantly burdened by such rules, t3 5 will have increased capacity to
present additional, diverse programming rather than specified
broadcast stations if they so choose. And this gain comes without
the loss of the omitted broadcast signals since they remain available
for over-the-air reception.136 Cable, under a relaxed must-carry ob-
131. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-76.67 (1985). See generally 1 CABLE TELEVISION LAW, supra
note 20, 7.04-7.09 (discussing history of must-carry rules).
132. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1434.
133. See Must Carry Rules, supra note 130.
134. Such commercial arrangements might involve changes in the compulsory copy-
right license now granted cable operators to transmit broadcast programming. See Going
to War Over Must Carry, BROADCASTING,July 29, 1985, at 23. For a brief description of the
federal copyright scheme for cable transmission of broadcast signals, see Quincy Cable,
768 F.2d at 1454 n.42; Must Carry Rules, supra note 130, at 857-58.
135. One system, for example, had 25 of its 32 channels occupied by must-carry sig-
nals including three ABC, two CBS, and two NBC affiliates. Must-Carry Winner, BROAD-
CASTING, July 29, 1985, at 25. See also Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1445 (describing Turner
Broadcasting System's allegation of economic detriment from the must-carry rules).
136. A simple and inexpensive (about $5.00) "A/B" switch allows a viewer to switch
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ligation, therefore has an even greater potential for diversifying tel-
evision viewing while remaining a nondisplacing substitute for
broadcasting.
C. Cable's Access Provisions
Mandatory access provisions imposed on cable operators re-
move their editorial control over some of their channels 13 7 and are
therefore subject to attack. Indeed, in its 1979 holding that cable
access rules imposed by the FCC exceeded the Commission's statu-
tory authority, the Supreme Court also noted that the first amend-
ment problems raised by such rules are "not frivolous."'' 3 1
Challenges to such provisions on first amendment and other
grounds undoubtedly will persist.'19  The public availability of
mandatory access to cable, therefore, remains uncertain.
Despite the Court's language in Red Lion, it is also uncertain to
what extent the scarcity rationale depends on the perceived unavail-
ability of individual access to the microphone side of television. In
addition to its holding denying such a right of access in CBS v. DNC,
the Court also found in the legislative history of the 1927 Radio Act
that Congress had specifically rejected the position that all persons
wishing to address public issues should have access to broadcast fa-
cilities on a nonselective basis.' 40 Indeed, the Communications Act
quickly and conveniently between cable and broadcast reception. See Quincy Cable, 768
F.2d at 1441 & n.16. The broadcast reception, however, requires an adequate antenna
and may be of poorer quality than if the signal were transmitted by cable. Id. And the
cable industry opposes any requirement for universal installation of such switches.
NCTA Report Blasts A/B Switch As Too Costly, BROADCASTING, Dec. 1, 1986, at 44. Nonethe-
less, the continued availability to consumers of broadcast stations directly over the air is
a centerpiece of current FCC regulation. See Must Carry Rules, supra note 130.
137. The 1984 Cable Act expressly prohibits an operator's editorial control over PEG
and leased commercial channels. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
138. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979) (Midwest Video II).
The Eighth Circuit had held that the rules violated the first amendment. Midwest Video
Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court, however, suggested
that "less intrusive" access provisions might be authorized and constitutional. Midwest
Video, 440 U.S. at 705 n.14.
139. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396
(9th Cir. 1985) (as amended June 13 & 26, 1985; amended version available on
WESTLAW, Allfeds library), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986) [three versions of Preferred
Communications have been published: (i) decided March 1, 1985-in advance sheets (754
F.2d 1396); (ii) as corrected May 20, 1985-in bound volume (same cite); (iii) as
amended June 13 & 26, 1985-available on WESTLAW]; Berkshire Cablevision of R.I.,
Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (lst Cir.
1985).
140. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 105-09 (1973).
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prohibits common carrier status for broadcasters, 14' and the Court
reiterated the Commission's position that "no private individual or
group has the right to command the use of broadcast facilities."' 4 2
Therefore, as long as broadcasters present the public with a suffi-
cient diversity of viewpoints, specific individual access to television
may not constitute a significant scarcity issue.
At any rate, cable's vast channel capacity should offer consider-
able opportunity for public access, whether or not mandated. Cable
operators certainly have every economic incentive to fill available
channels for which there may be a lack of programming. Further-
more, there is no reason to anticipate or have particular concern
that cable operators will discriminate in selling time 43 to or cover-
ing certain groups or individuals. After all, any such discrimination
by daily metropolitan newspapers-which generally enjoy a greater
monopoly in their print medium than cable operators (who must
compete with broadcasters) enjoy in the television medium-is
properly a journalistic concern, not a governmental one. 14 4 The
same should be true of cable. Cable, then, can substantially en-
hance public access to television, thereby eliminating any vestige of
scarcity based on a lack of such access.
D. Cable As a Natural Monopoly
Cable, as the answer to scarcity, is subject to a possible counter-
argument. Although cable is not constrained by the same perceived
physical limitations as broadcasting, it still might be considered
scarce in the economic sense of being a "natural monopoly." In
other words, due to certain immutable economic factors in the cable
industry, the long-range competitive equilibrium would result in a
single firm serving a given geographic area. This natural monopoly,
141. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982).
142. CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. at 113. See also CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981)
(upholding § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act as creating a limited right to reason-
able access for legally qualified candidates for federal elective office, while emphasizing
there is no general right of access to the media).
143. There also is no reason to think that such access to cable should be free, since
even statutorily mandated access for federal candidates under § 312(a)(7) of the Com-
munications Act is not free. See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 382 n.8 (citing Kennedy for
President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 446-50 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
144. " 'The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political, social,
and economic views is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient
number of readers-and hence advertisers-to assure financial success; and, second, the
journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.'" Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.




achieved by either competitive processes or governmentally
awarded exclusive franchises, results in a single gatekeeper control-
ling the cable channels subscribers receive. Editorially independent
television channels thus remain scarce and, it is feared, diversity in
programming may be restricted. However, this natural monopoly
argument has severe limitations, and even with a single cable opera-
tor it does not follow that diversity will suffer. 145
Traditionally a natural monopoly is thought to exist in an in-
dustry in which there are sufficient economies of scale that a single
firm can serve the market at lower unit cost than two or more
firms.1 4 6 In such a situation regulation generally is thought neces-
sary to protect consumers from monopoly market power which ad-
versely affects prices and quality of service. 14 7 The argument that
cable satisfies the conditions of a natural monopoly depends on the
cost characteristics of the industry. 4
8
145. A preliminary issue here-and perhaps also for the access discussion in the pre-
ceding section-is whether diversity in television programming can be measured mean-
ingfully. Such measurement requires classifying programs on a social-political-economic
scale and therefore is necessarily vague and subjective. Moreover, the relationship, if
any, between an increased number of independent programming sources and greater
programming diversity is uncertain. See Noam, Local Distribution Monopolies in Cable Televi-
sion and Telephone Service: The Scope for Competition, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
TODAY AND TOMORROW 351, 369 (E. Noam ed. 1983).
146. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
119 (1971); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 317-21 (3d ed. 1986); F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 482 (2d ed. 1980). See
generally W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (1982); Hazlett, The Curious
Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory, in UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES 1-25 (R. Poole, Jr., ed.
1985).
2 A. KAHN, supra, at 119, states:
The critical and-if properly defined-all-embracing characteristic of natural
monopoly is an inherent tendency to decreasing unit costs over the entire ex-
tent of the market. This is so only where the economies achievable by a larger
output are internal to the individual firm-if, that is to say, it is only as more
output is concentrated in a single supplier that unit costs will decline.
147. See R. POSNER, supra note 146, at 320; F. SCHERER, supra note 146, at 482.
148. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 146, at 119 ("The principal source of this tendency [to
decreasing unit costs] is the necessity of making a large investment merely in order to be
in a position to serve customers on demand."). A good summary of the cable natural
monopoly argument by a well-known telecommunications economist is set forth in an
affidavit filed in a cable franchising case very similar to Preferred Communications. See Dec-
laration of Stanley M. Besen in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion, in Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, No. S-83-1034 MLS (E.D. Cal.,
preliminary injunction denied, May 9, 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1986) [herein-
after Besen Declaration]. This was countered by the Declaration of Thomas W. Hazlett.
Professor Hazlett has recently expounded his views in Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the
Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335
(1986).
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In particular, there are high fixed costs for a cable system's
headend and for the installation and maintenance of a distribution
system of trunk lines to serve all potential subscribers.' 4 9 These
costs depend on factors such as the size of the geographic area
wired and the channel capacity of the system, but do not depend on
the number of actual subscribers. 5 ° Since a large proportion of a
system's costs is independent of the number of subscribers, signifi-
cant economies of scale result as average cost decreases with each
additional subscriber. 15 Moreover, these fixed costs require an in-
tensive initial capital investment. This investment is "sunk" in that
it cannot easily be recovered and reinvested elsewhere if the cable
enterprise is unprofitable. This creates an additional barrier to en-
try, further insulating an existing cable system from potential com-
petition."' The natural monopoly status of cable is supported by
engineering and econometric studies and by the practical experi-
ence of most cable systems operating as de facto monopolies.15 3
On the other hand, the argument that cable is inescapably a
natural monopoly is subject to substantial challenge. 154 For exam-
ple, the assumption of high fixed costs leading to declining per-unit
costs may be offset by increasing per-unit costs of management or-
ganization. 55 Further, a significant portion of the high fixed costs
149. See G. WEBB, THE ECONOMICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 41-63 (1983); Meyerson, The
First Amendment and the Cable Television Operator: An Unprotective Shield Against Public Access
Requirements, 4 CoMM/ENT L.J. 1, 4-8 (1982).
150. Other costs of servicing subscribers-e.g., connecting subscribers to the distribu-
tion trunks, providing converters, billing, etc.-and of providing programming may vary
with the number of subscribers. See Besen Declaration, supra note 148, at 5-6.
151. There may be economies both in providing the same services to additional sub-
scribers with a single system (economies of scale) and in combining different services on
one system even if this requires increasing that system's capacity (economies of scope).
See Besen Declaration, supra note 148, at 6-7. Thus Besen concludes that there is un-
likely to be competition between two or more cable companies providing either the
same services or different collections of services in the same geographic area. Id. at 17-
18. Cf. Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1368-69 (arguing that by focusing exclusively on econ-
omies of scale and assuming away all differences between products and among con-
sumer tastes, one loses altogether the rationale for competitive enterprise).
152. Besen Declaration, supra note 148, at 23-25.
153. Id. at 7-16, 19-23. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 146, at 126 states:
The clearest case of natural monopoly is in local distribution, where a single
investment in distribution network and plant, a single hook-up with the ulti-
mate user, a single periodic reading of meters and billing can handle an expan-
sion of sales within all foreseeable limits at incremental costs far below average
and in important respects at zero cost.
154. See Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1364-75; Hazlett, Competition vs. Franchise Monopoly
in Cable Television, 4 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 80, 95 (1986).
155. See Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1366. Hazlett also describes "the inevitable limita-
tions on technical economies of scale" in the cable industry. Id.
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may be due to services demanded by a franchising authority as a
condition of the franchise.' 56 Moreover, while the need to invest
heavily in fixed, non-salvageable capital goods may discourage new
entrants into the cable market, it also gives an established cable op-
erator more to lose if an entrant is successful. Thus, potential en-
trants pose a greater threat to operators whose prices or services
deteriorate so as to invite competition.' 57 While almost all cable
systems enjoy exclusivity in their operating territories,158 then, this
may be due more to municipalities' granting exclusive franchises on
the assumption of a natural monopoly than to the actual existence of
determinative economic factors.
59
At any rate, the uncertain issue of cable's "natural monopoly"
tendencies does not require governmental intervention to assure
programming diversity. First, we can be justifiably skeptical of
econometric arguments of natural monopoly conditions as the basis
for government regulation. 16' This is particularly the case when
156. See G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND, & J. MERCURIO, "CABLESPEECH": THE CASE FOR
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 202 (1983). Hazlett cites an accounting study estimating
that about 22% of subscriber revenues is used to cover costs resulting solely from
franchising requirements. Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1363. He also notes that such
governmentally imposed services must be of low economic value to consumers; other-
wise, cable companies would be happy to provide and profit from them without govern-
ment coercion. Id. at 1363 n.99, 1381, 1385. In effect, it is the franchising authority that
exercises monopoly market power. See G. WEBB, supra note 149, at 175, 179-80.
157. Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1376.
158. There are very few examples of successful "overbuilds" of cable systems, i.e., of
two or more cable systems in direct competition. See Meyerson, supra note 149, at 8-9;
see also Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1370-75 (discussing alternative rationales other than
natural monopoly for the lack of overbuild systems); Lee, Cable Franchising and the First
Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867, 880-84 (1983) (arguing there is little empirical evi-
dence that cable is a natural monopoly in all markets); cf. CABLEVISION, Oct. 13, 1986, at
60 (describing increased speculation about overbuilds).
159. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc., v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States,
757 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
160. As one influential econometric analysis of the cost structure of modern cable
television systems concludes: "Economies of scale and cost subadditivity, while present,
are not so substantial as to rule out entirely the possibility of effective actual or potential
competition in this industry." Owen & Greenhalgh, Competitive Considerations in Cable Tel-
evision Franchising, 4 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 69, 78 (1986). See also A. SMILEY, DIRECT
COMPETITION AMONG CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEMS 34-35 (U.S. Dept. ofJustice Economic
Analysis Group Discussion Paper 86-9, 1986) ("Under mandatory rate deregulation, it is
reasonable to conclude that overbuild competition has a potentially significant welfare-
enhancing role."); Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1370 ("[T]he existence of monopoly,
whether in franchised jurisdictions or in open entry communities, is not by itself evi-
dence contradicting the consumer advantages of free competition."); Noam, Economies of
Scale in Cable Television: A Multiproduct Analysis, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION 93-120 (E.
Noam ed. 1985) (finding only small economies of scale in number of homes passed).
The long distance telephone industry, for example, once thought to be a natural mo-
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such regulation has significant first amendment implications' 6 ' and
in an industry subject to dynamic changes.' 62 Indeed, those courts
that have considered the natural monopoly issue in the context of
cable regulation have split over it.' 63
Moreover, even if the natural monopoly argument is applicable
to cable, it does not justify municipality control over entry into the
cable market. Exclusive franchising by municipalities not only le-
gally forecloses actual or potential competitive forces that otherwise
might arise;"6 it may also stifle a periodic beneficial competitive
process that would allow the market to determine the "best" cable
nopoly, is now workably competitive. See generally Samuel, Telecommunications: After the
Bell Break-Up, in UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES, supra note 146, at 177-203. The same is true
of the overnight mail delivery market. Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1355-57.
161. Cf. Minneapolis Star and Tribune v. Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
589-90 (1983) ("The complexities of factual economic proof always present a certain
potential for error .... [T]he possibility of error inherent in the proposed [tax] rule
poses too great a threat to concerns at the heart of the First Amendment, and we cannot
tolerate that possibility.").
162. Communications is a contemporary example of an industry undergoing
rapid technological changes that are apparently opening up a host of new com-
petitive opportunities. In general, the tempo of change in the economy seems
to be increasing. The most pernicious feature of regulation would appear to be
precisely its impact on change-its tendency to retard the growth of competi-
tion that would erode the power of regulated monopolists. To embrace regula-
tion because an industry is today a natural monopoly and seems likely to
remain so is to gamble dangerously with the future. To impose regulation on
the basis of a prophecy that the industry will remain monopolistic forever may
be to make the prophecy self-fulfilling.
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 636 (1969).
163. Compare, e.g., Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055 (8th Cir. 1978)
(quoting Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977), to the effect that economic scarcity is insufficient to justify govern-
ment intrusion into the first amendment rights of cable television), aff'd on other grounds,
440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video II); HBO v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 46; and Century
Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that fact
that cable television market in a proposed service area is a natural monopoly does not
justify greater regulation than would otherwise be allowed under the first amendment)
with Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 717 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding that the natural monopoly characteristics of the cable market in
question justified the regulation imposed by the city); Omega Satellite Prods. v. City of
Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,J.) (discussing the "apparent
natural monopoly characteristics of cable television"); Community Communications v.
City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379-80 (10th Cir. 1981) (recognizing natural monop-
oly as a constitutionally permissible justification for regulation of cable but noting that
the degree of regulation depends, inter alia, upon the "degree of natural monopoly"),
cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); and Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571
F. Supp. 976, 986 (D.R.I. 1983) (finding economic scarcity a constitutionally sufficient
rationale for the regulation of cable television), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.
1985).
164. Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1372-80.
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operator to service a region rather than having that long-term selec-
tion made politically and bureaucratically by a franchising author-
ity. 165 The market process favors the diversity actually desired by
cable subscribers; the franchising process enshrines a governmental
body's concept of appropriate diversity.' 66
The natural monopoly argument further fails to support sub-
stantive regulation of cable because the Supreme Court in Tornillo
emphatically rejected the concept of economic scarcity as the basis
for media regulation. 67 Indeed, the argument only proves, if any-
thing, that there are monopolistic tendencies in the distribution sys-
tem for cable services but not in the market for the end product-
namely, audio/video programming received on a television set.
There are, for example, substantial economies of scale in the trans-
mission phase of printing and delivering daily newspapers 168 con-
tributing to the de facto exclusivity that most large, daily
metropolitan newspapers enjoy.' 69 No one, however, even aside
from Tornillo, seriously thinks of affirmatively mandating diversity in
the pages of a newspaper. Such a demand would be strange since
the newspaper has no monopoly on communication in the print me-
dia. Similarly, a cable operator, even one with a legally created dis-
tribution monopoly, faces significant programming competition
from broadcasters, and at least potential competition from newer,
emerging technologies. 170 Indeed, the desire to foster competition
165. "There is a world of difference between the performance that one would expect
of a monopolist that survived a competitive struggle to serve its customers and what one
expects of a monopolist that is granted a franchise that frees it through state action of
any fear of competition." Owen, Recent Developments in Cable Television Regulation, REGULA-
TORY REFORM (published by the Industry Regulation Committee of the ABA Section of
Antitrust Law), Dec. 1985, at 4. See also Hazlett, Private Contracting Versus Public Regulation
as a Solution to the Natural Monopoly Problem, in UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES, supra note 146, at
71-114. But see Central Telecommunications, 800 F.2d at 716 n.5.
166. See Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1383; see also Century Federal, 648 F. Supp at 1477
(the public's first amendment rights "are endangered by a governmental attitude that
government knows best how to fine tune the flow of information to which they have
access").
167. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1974). If only a
single movie theatre or bookstore could survive economically in a particular town that
would hardly be a basis for requiring subject matter diversity. See Century Federal, 648 F.
Supp. at 1478.
168. See Spitzer, Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1349,
1374-75 (1985).
169. See supra note 97.
170. For an excellent discussion of intermedia competition for the video entertain-
ment market among cable, broadcasting, and the new video services, see Hazlett, supra
note 148, at 1390-1400. For a discussion of the broader competitive alternatives to
cable across the range of functions cable can perform, see Jackson, Cable and Public Utility
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in programming led the FCC some time ago to preempt state and
local regulation of pay cable rates,' 7 ' and, following the 1984 Cable
Act, the FCC has relied on the competition between cable and
broadcasting to free basic cable services from rate regulation in
most instances.' 72 Thus, whatever other merit the cable monopoly
argument may have, the continued availability of broadcast signals
should preclude that argument from supporting programming regu-
lation of cable in the name of diversity or otherwise.
Finally, there is no great danger that a single cable operator, as
gatekeeper over a multiplicity of channels, would result in uniform-
ity in programming. Although cable operators exercise considera-
ble editorial discretion,173 especially over channels on which they
originate their own programming, 74 on most channels they simply
select a programmer and retransmit everything that programmer
provides. 175 In these cases the operator, often like a newspaper or
magazine editor or a network-affiliated broadcast station, is acting as
a conduit for the ideas, viewpoints, and programs of others. This
variety is then supplemented by the operator's own original pro-
Regulation, in UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES, supra note 146, at 153-71. See also Noam, supra
note 145, at 351-416 (arguing that technological and economic advantages will give
cable dominance over most of its current communications competitors, but concluding
that telephone companies should be allowed to provide cable service as common carri-
ers in competition with well-established, existing cable companies and, in turn, cable
companies should be able to provide telephone service so that each will counteract the
other's monopoly position); cf. Baer, Telephone and Cable Companies: Rivals or Partners in
Video Distribution?, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION, 187-213 (E. Noam ed. 1985) (discuss-
ing the evolving relationships between telephone and cable companies in light of
changes in underlying video distribution technologies, costs, and regulatory rules). For
a description of the new video technologies, see infra notes 185-191.
171. See Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765, 767 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979); see also Community Cable TV, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1204 (1983)
(preempting specialized or auxiliary cable system rate regulation as well as that of pay or
subscription services), reconsid. denied, 98 F.C.C.2d 1180 (1984).
172. See infra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
173. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 & n.17 (1979) (Midwest
Video II); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
754 F.2d 1396, 1410 n.10 (9th Cir. 1984) (as amended June 13 & 26, 1985; amended
version available on WESTLAW, Allfeds library), af'd, 106 S. Ct. 2034, 2037 (1986);
Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 n.12 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
174. See "LO. ", CABLEVISION, Nov. 25, 1985, at 28 (describing the increasing impor-
tance of locally originated cable programming).
175. For example, a cable operator might agree with a movie channel to show its pro-
grams without additions, deletions, or modifications. Presumably, though, the operator
could seek to change or terminate the agreement if dissatisfied with the programming.
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gramming together with whatever provisions exist for PEG and
leased commercial access channels.
Moreover, the nature of cablecasting ensures that an operator
will offer a wide variety of programming. Cablecasting is really
"narrowcasting" since entire channels often are devoted to specific
formats-news, sports, movies, children's programming, adult pro-
gramming, etc.-each designed to appeal to specific groups of view-
ers. A broadcaster, with only one station to offer the public, has to
maximize its audience (and hence its advertising revenue). There-
fore, it must appeal to the broadest cross-section of the population,
often with programming of the lowest common denominator-
bland, uncontroversial, and usually uninteresting. On the other
hand, a cable operator with a large number of channels, many of
which are aimed at specific audiences, has every incentive to offer as
many different kinds of programming as possible in order to attract
different segments of the viewing population, thereby maximizing
total subscriptions. Other factors being equal, the more channels
available to an operator, the greater variety of programming it will
provide, consistent with market demand. Thus, given the large
channel capacity of modern cable systems, and the variety of pro-
gramming available to fill these channels, cable offers genuine diver-
sity as a solution to the scarcity problem.'
76
E. Cable's Economic Availability
There is another sense in which cable might be thought eco-
nomically scarce: is it available to subscribers in a way that makes it
comparable to broadcast television and sufficiently prevalent to
eliminate any remnants of broadcast scarcity? An average subscrip-
tion to cable television might include a one-time installation fee
(perhaps reduced or waived with a promotional offer) and a current
monthly fee of about $9 for basic tier service, expected to increase
to almost $14 per month by 1990.1 77 Additional premium channels
176. See Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1386:
To argue that cable firms would not, in a competitive environment, provide the
sorts of services that local governments select clearly attests to the inefficiency
generated by the franchising process. Since the profit-maximizing strategy in a
competitive environment is to provide all increments of capacity and program-
ming that consumers value more than the opportunity cost, political selection
of cable services has a negative impact on social welfare by imposing the supply
of services worth less than their cost.
177. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., PROSPERITV FOR CABLE TV: OUTLOOK 1985-1990, at 12
(1985). The 1984 Cable Act deregulates the setting of most subscriber fees. 47 U.S.C.
§ 543 (Supp. III 1985).
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such as Home Box Office (HBO) might cost about another $10 per
month, with a slight reduction expected over the next few years,' 78
and with several such premium channels perhaps offered together
as one tier at a special price.
Cable, then, might appear to be expensive, especially compared
to "free" broadcast television, and therefore of limited availability
to viewers. There is, however, no reason to expect free access to a
communications medium. Books, magazines, newspapers, theaters,
and the like all cost money. Moreover, broadcast television is not
really "free" in the true economic sense, since one generally incurs
nontrivial "costs" or disutility with broadcast television in order to
be able to watch a desired program at a desired time. Commercials,
of course, constitute the majority of these "CoStS. ' ' 17 9 Cable, with its
limited advertising, especially on pay channels, and its narrowcast-
ing feature, saves much of these costs.
In addition, if a family's average monthly cost for the basic and
premium cable service it wants is $29,"80 that family need not actu-
ally bear an additional $29 out-of-pocket expense in order to afford
cable.s' Rather, since cable provides entertainment such as uned-
ited and uninterrupted feature movies, concerts, major sports
events, and the like, a family's investment in cable is in good mea-
sure not an additional out-of-pocket expense but a partial shift of its
entertainment dollars from activities outside the home to cableview-
ing. i82 These factors therefore indicate that the marginal cost of
subscribing to cable is only a modest burden for many viewers who
willingly accept that burden for an alternative to "free" broadcast
television. Cable's success in creating a nationwide market supports
178. ARTHUR D. LrrrLE, INC., supra note 177, at 13.
179. See 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 201 n.21 1; Levy & Pitsch,
supra note 130, at 69-70. The cost of advertising, which supports free broadcast televi-
sion, ultimately is passed along to viewers as consumers, though not in any direct rela-
tionship to viewing habits. Most viewers, however, consider television broadcast
commercials a fair price to pay for the medium and a useful source of product informa-
tion. THE ROPER ORGANIZATION, INC., PUBLIC ATrITUDES TOWARDS TELEVISION AND
OTHER MEDIA IN A TIME OF CHANGE 21-22 (1985).
180. See ARTHUR D. LrrLE, INC., supra note 177, at 7, 9.
181. Some portion of the $29 should be allocated to the improved reception of
whatever broadcast stations are carried on cable.
182. Given the costs of going out, including tickets for performances, transportation
and parking, babysitting, food, and the like, a family would have to forego only a few
nights out per month in favor of watching cable to make up most, if not all, of the
monthly cable fee. See G. WEBB, supra note 149, at 70 (citing statistical evidence that




this conclusion 83 and establishes that cable is readily available for a
considerable portion of the public.
84
F. The Rest of the Electronic Video Marketplace
Finally, even if cable by itself is insufficient to eliminate broad-
cast scarcity, surely when considered together with the alphabet
soup of other technologies in the new electronic video market-
place, it is apparent that scarcity is a thing of the past. Low power
television (LPTV),181 subscription television (STV), 186 direct broad-
cast satellites (DBS),1 87  satellite master antenna television
183. The conclusion is further supported by the apparent lack of price sensitivity, at
least within the current range of prices, in the demand for cable service. See ARTHUR D.
LITrLE, INC., supra note 177, at 12, 35; see also G. WEBB, supra note 149, at 70 (citing
evidence indicating cable's appeal to both low and high income groups).
184. It is also worth noting that the 1984 Cable Act prohibits denying access to cable
service through economic redlining. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985).
185. Low power television utilizes small broadcast transmitters called "translators,"
which formerly only rebroadcast signals from full-service television stations to geo-
graphically isolated regions, but which now may originate programming, sell advertising
or subscription services, and generally become stations in their own right. They operate
at limited wattage to avoid interfering with full-power stations and therefore have lim-
ited geographical reach. See Future Role of Low Power Television Broadcasting in the
National Telecommunications System, 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 476 (1982), reconsid. de-
nied, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,478 (1983), aff'd, Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629
(D.C. Cir. 1984). See generally SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 97, at 75-76; Stern,
Krasnow & Senkowski, The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a Consistent Regulatory
Philosophy, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 529, 538-40 (1983) (discussing low power television)
[hereinafter New Video Marketplace]. Upon allowing translators to originate programming
in 1982, the FCC was swamped with thousands of applications for the relatively inexpen-
sive LPTV stations, including proposals for a wide diversity of programming. New Video
Marketplace, supra. As of mid-1985 there were 126 licensed low power UHF stations and
215 low power VHF stations, with predictions that this technology will eventually add
4,000 television stations to the marketplace. 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note
2, at 211-12.
186. Subscription television is a pay service offered by local broadcast stations that
transmit a scrambled signal on an allocated frequency to subscribers who then decode it
at their television receivers. While this technology has existed for several decades, the
FCC's recent elimination of restrictions on STV has sparked increased interest in and
expansion of this service. See Subscription TV Serv., 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982); New Video
Marketplace, supra note 185, at 532-34. As of June 1984, there were approximately
700,000 STV subscribers and 19 STV channels operating in 17 markets. 1985 Fairness
Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 216.
187. Direct broadcast satellite systems use high-power, geostationary satellites to pick
up a signal beamed from earth (the uplink) and retransmit it directly to small dish anten-
nas owned by subscribers (the downlink). This differs from current communications
satellite operations which are considerably less powerful and therefore require large,
fixed, and relatively expensive dish antennas and other equipment for reception. Using
several satellites to cover the country, DBS will provide a national, direct-to-home televi-
sion service not tied to any local community. See Direct Broadcast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d
676, 680-82 (1982), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v.
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(SMATV), t88 multipoint distribution service (MDS),' 89 teletext and
videotext,' 90 and video cassette recorders (VCRs) and videodisc
FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See generally SENATE COMMITrEE PRINT, supra note
97, at 72-73; Anderson, The Economic, Legal and Scientific Implications of Direct Broadcast
Satellites, 7 COMM. & L. 3 (1985); New Video Marketplace, supra note 185, at 540-43. DBS
will be able to offer additional channels with specialized and technically innovative serv-
ices reaching even remote areas beyond regular broadcast stations or cable. New Video
Marketplace, supra note 185, at 542. Indeed, the potential for DBS systems to "wire" the
world raises profound international issues. See Gorove, International Direct Television
Broadcasting by Satellite. "Prior Consent" Revisited, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1985);
Webster, Direct Broadcast Satellites, Proximity, Sovereignty and National Identity, 62 FOREIGN
AFF. 1161 (1984). The great expense, however, of a DBS system has slowed its develop-
ment and clouded its future. See Direct Broadcasting Satellites, BROADCASTING, July 1, 1985,
at 22; CBS Drops Out of Running for DBS, BROADCASTING, July 2, 1984, at 38. Despite the
system's potential, the FCC does not yet consider DBS to be a significant contributor to
the electronic video marketplace. 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 214-
15.
188. SMATV is really "mini-cable" in that it consists of an operator's satellite-fed
master dish antenna which serves an apartment building or a complex of buildings
through coaxial cable. Since these systems operate on private property they are largely
unregulated. See Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1223 (1983), aff'd
sub nom. New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Deregulation of Receive Only Domestic Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d 205 (1979);
see also Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (Supp. III 1985)
(excluding from the definition of a "cable system" SMATV systems that do not use a
public right of way). This lack of regulation, and the fact that in high-density areas an
SMATV system is usually faster and easier to install than a regular cable system, allow
SMATV to compete with cable. See generally New Video Marketplace, supra note 185, at 543-
45 (discussing SMATV). Estimates of SMATV subscribership vary considerably. See
1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 213.
189. MDS is a common carrier service that uses omnidirectional microwave signals for
line-of-sight transmission from a fixed location to subscribers' receivers equipped with
directional antennas. See Multipoint Distribution Serv., 45 F.C.C.2d 616 (1974). See gen-
erally New Video Marketplace, supra note 185, at 545-49. Thus, without utilizing standard
broadcast frequencies and without wires, an MDS system can provide programming sim-
ilar to that on cable to its subscribers within its limited (about twenty-five miles) geo-
graphical range. Although MDS operators originally were allowed only one channel, the
Commission recently reallocated channels from the Instructional Television Fixed Ser-
vice (ITFS) to allow multichannel MDS (MMDS), which will make that service all the
more competitive. Instructional Television Fixed Service, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203 (1983); see
also 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 212-13; MMDS Coming Alive Despite
Barriers, CABLEVISION, Dec. 15, 1986, at 34. The FCC also has made a similar technology,
operational-fixed microwave service (OFS), a viable means of delivering home video en-
tertainment. See Operational-Fixed Service, 99 F.C.C.2d 715 (1983); New Video Market-
place, supra note 185, at 549-50.
190. Teletext and videotext may be considered electronic publishing, a blend of print
media and electronic transmission of signals.
Teletext refers to the one-way transmission of textual and graphic information to a
home receiver. The signal could be carried by cable, MDS, or LPTV; however, teletext
often refers to utilization of the vertical blanking interval (VBI) of a television broadcast
signal. (The typical television picture consists of 525 lines rapidly scanned by the tube's
electron gun to create an image. The VBI consists of twenty-one such lines between
scans, appearing as a black bar when a television image rolls, some of which are available
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players (VDPs) 9 ' are all alternative methods for receiving and view-
ing an audio/video signal on a home television receiver. Therefore,
they all provide additional opportunities for communication
through that medium.
It is difficult to predict just what impact these various new and
still emerging technologies will have on the video marketplace.
However, it is clear that we are undergoing an explosion of new
sources of home video entertainment and information. 192 This arti-
cle focuses on cable as the most significant and important of these
technologies. t 93 Thus, it is imperative to the demise of the scarcity
rationale that cable properly be viewed as entirely comparable with
and substitutable for broadcasting. The major cable cases support
such a result.
IV. JUDICIAL SUPPORT FOR A UNIFIED CABLE/BROADCASTING
MEDIUM
Several major decisions on the statutorily authorized and con-
stitutionally permissible scope of cable regulation distinguish cable
from broadcasting and refuse to apply to cable the pervasive sort of
regulation that has become commonplace for broadcasting. In-
to carry information which can be displayed on the screen with special terminal equip-
ment. See WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 403,
405-06 (N.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 622, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1982)). See generally Offer-
ing of Data Transmission Services on the Vertical Blanking Interval by TV Stations, 57
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 832 (1985); Transmission of Teletext by TV Stations, 53 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1309 (1983), reconsid. denied, 101 F.C.C.2d 827 (1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
and remanded, Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501
(D.C. Cir. 1986); New Video Marketplace, supra note 185, at 534-38. Teletext offers nu-
merous possibilities for diversified television services on an advertiser- or subscriber-
supported basis. See Note, Teletext and the F. C. C.: Turning the Content Regulatory Clock Back-
ward, 64 B.U.L. REV. 1057, 1073-78 (1984). Videotext refers to two-way, interactive
teletext services using either two-way cable or telephone lines. See generally Videotext Sym-
posium, 36 FED. COM. LJ. 149 (1984).
191. VCRs are capable of playing prerecorded tapes, thereby making available mate-
rial neither televised nor cablecast; they also can record and play back material from
television or other sources such as an attached camera. This time-shifting feature of
VCRs thereby increases the audience for television and cable programming. Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 423 (1984). See generally New Video
Marketplace, supra note 185, at 556-57. VDPs, which use phonograph-type records in-
stead of tapes, cannot record material but have other useful features. Id. at 557.
192. See SENATE COMMI-rEE PRINT, supra note 97, at 80-81 for estimates of the market
penetration of some of these services by 1990. See also Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1387-
1400 (discussing intermedia competition for video market). But see The New Order Passeth,
BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 43 (suggesting that except for cable the alphabet soup
of the new media has grown cold since the new technologies collectively have failed to
gain a sufficient foothold to compete adequately with cable and broadcasting).
193. See I. DE SoLA PooL, supra note 99, at 155.
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stead, these courts treat cable more like newspapers. When prop-
erly viewed, however, these cases nonetheless support the
functional similarity between cable and broadcasting and the argu-
ment for treating a unified cable/broadcast medium more like the
print media for first amendment purposes. Indeed, the similarity
and competitive relationship between the two were implicit even in
the Supreme Court's initial ruling allowing the FCC to regulate
cable to the extent "reasonably ancillary" to its effective regulation
of broadcasting. 94
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,'9 5 however, contains the first signifi-
cant and explicit substantive analysis of the first amendment impli-
cations of cable regulation.' 96 In that case the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed virtually identical restrictions on pay program-
ming applicable to both cable and subscription broadcast television.
The FCC designed these restrictions to prevent pay services from
"siphoning" popular program material away from free broadcast
television through competitive bidding. The court upheld the sub-
scription broadcast rules, subject to further proceedings, confirming
an earlier holding 9 7 that the scarcity rationale for broadcast regula-
tion espoused in NBC and reaffirmed in Red Lion overcame first
amendment objections to the rules. 198
Yet the court could not apply the first amendment rationale of
NBC and Red Lion directly to the rules regulating cable television
because of the "important differences between cable and broadcast
television."' 9 9 In particular, physical scarcity, "an essential precon-
194. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). See also
Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that the FCC's
regulation of cable has same constitutional status as its regulation of broadcasting be-
cause of cable's "unique impact upon, and relationship with, the television broadcast
service"); cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (distinguishing, for copy-
right purposes, broadcasting and early cable systems); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Art-
ists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398-401 (1968) (finding that, for copyright purposes,
early cable systems have little in common with the function of broadcasters). Black Hills
Video dealt with early and fundamentally different community antenna television systems
(CATV); its approval of pervasive cable regulation is of "doubtful precedent today."
Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.
1985), aft'd, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
195. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
196. For a review of prior cases touching on this issue, see id. at 45 n.80.
197. National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
198. 567 F.2d at 34, 44 n.79, 59.
199. Id. at 43.
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dition of that theory," is absent with cable.2 °° Moreover, alluding to
cable's possible status as a natural monopoly, the court relied on
Tornillo for the proposition that economic scarcity is insufficient to
justify governmental intrusion on the media's first amendment
rights. Thus, there was "nothing... to suggest a constitutional dis-
tinction between cable television and newspapers. '"201
The court therefore invalidated the pay cable rules even though
recognizing that they were not intended to suppress free expres-
sion.22 Had the court viewed the issue as the regulation of a uni-
fied, non-scarce cable/broadcast medium, the same reasoning might
have voided the restrictions for both facets of that medium. 20 3
However, since the crucial distinction between cable and broadcast-
ing was simply one of scarcity, the court's opinion in no way under-
mines cable/broadcasting similarity in all other respects. Rather, it
supports the fact that such a unified medium, which is not scarce,
should enjoy the same constitutional status as the print media.
This conclusion is reinforced by several subsequent cases deal-
ing solely with cable regulation. In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. ,204 for
example, the Court reviewed FCC imposition of mandatory access
and minimum channel capacity requirements on cable systems. A
majority found that such rules exceeded the Commission's statutory
authority but also noted that they raised first amendment questions
that are "not frivolous."20 5  This therefore implies that, when
squarely faced with a first amendment challenge to cable or broad-
cast regulation which is no longer justified by scarcity, the Court
200. Id. at 45. The court also noted the absence of interference among speakers on a
cable.
201. Id. at 46.
202. Id. at 48. The court found that the rules served no important or substantial gov-
ernment interest, id. at 50, and were "grossly overbroad," id. at 51.
203. Compare id. at 46-51 (voiding pay cable rules) with id. at 59-60 (upholding sub-
scription broadcast television rules). The court, however, had a better factual record to
rely on with respect to subscription television. Id. at 59. See also National Ass'n of Thea-
tre Owners, 420 F.2d 194, 207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (upholding regulation of subscrip-
tion television), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
204. 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video II).
205. Id. at 709 n. 19. Also see the Court of Appeals' more extensive discussion of the
first amendment issues, in which it concluded: "[W]e have seen and heard nothing in
this case to indicate a constitutional distinction between cable systems and newspapers."
Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1056 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979) (Midwest Video II). Cf. Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision,
Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 1986) (after discussing case law concerning first
amendment distinction between cable and newspapers, declining to take position on
record before it); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370,
1377-78 (10th Cir. 1981) (inappropriate to summarily apply to cable operators the first
amendment principles governing newspapers), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
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may apply the same principles that govern the print media. Indeed,
since the Court specifically acknowledged the functional similarity
between cable and broadcasting concerning the basic first amend-
ment media freedom to exercise editorial discretion,20 6 it is difficult
to see how the Court could do otherwise.
Two recent cases in particular illustrate the importance of not
letting distinctions between cable and broadcasting, adduced in the
context of cable regulation, obscure their basic similarity and the
value of considering them a unified medium.20 7 In Preferred Communi-
cations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles 208 the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
missal of a potential cable operator's first amendment claim that a
city could not condition an operator's right to construct and operate
a cable system upon participation in a franchise auction procedure
or other plan subject to the city's discretion. The court framed the
"fundamental issue" as whether a city could limit to one the number
of cable companies serving a given region, assuming that the region
could physically accommodate more than one system.20 9 The court
answered that question in the negative. It thus partly sustained Pre-
ferred's "sweeping attack" on the city's cable franchise process by
requiring the grant of franchises "to all cable operators who are
willing to satisfy the City's legitimate conditions," at least so long as
the city has facilities to do so. 2
10
The city argued that the constitutional standards applicable to
government regulation of broadcasting should apply to cable as
well. The court disagreed, stating that "[d]espite the superficial
similarity between broadcasting and cable television, there are sig-
nificant differences between the two media that have First Amend-
206. Midwest Video 11, 440 U.S. at 707; see also Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto,
648 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (drawing an analogy between cable and
traditional print media for purposes of editorial discretion).
207. For other cases examining the issue of cable's relationship to the broadcast and
print media, see Omega Satellite Prods. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28
(7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1377-79; Century Federal, Inc. v.
City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1562-64 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (motion to dismiss), 648
F. Supp. 1465 (1986) (granting partial summary judgment); Berkshire Cablevision of
R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985-87 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382
(1st Cir. 1985); Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 543, 547 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
208. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
209. Id. at 1401. The court specifically avoided passing on the validity of any particu-
lar requirements imposed by the city through the franchising process, id. at 1401, 1406
n.9, but noted that the city's mandatory and leased access requirements "pose particu-
larly troubling constitutional questions," id. at 1401 n.4. The court also affirmed dis-
missal of Preferred's antitrust claims. Id. at 1415.
210. Id. at 1401, 1409.
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ment consequences." '' The sole difference the court described,
however, was the apparent physical scarcity of radiowaves. Citing
NBC, the court recognized that "government intrusion into the af-
fairs of broadcasters" rests on this attribute.2 12 Since on the facts
before the court the city's facilities could accommodate more than
one cable system, the city could not justify its desired scope of cable
regulation on a similar physical scarcity. The court, therefore, inval-
idated the city's limitation on competing cable systems even though
by doing so it implicitly questioned the constitutionality of key pro-
visions of the 1984 Cable Act.213
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, although on the
"narrower ground" that the well-pleaded allegations of the com-
plaint raised sufficient factual issues so that the legal issues should
not be resolved on a motion to dismiss without a more thoroughly
developed record.21 4 The Court, therefore, specifically avoided de-
ciding whether Tornillo or Red Lion applied to cable and, like the
Ninth Circuit, avoided first amendment challenges to many of the
city's franchise conditions.21 5
The Court, however, did reaffirm the right of editorial discre-
tion exercised by cable operators whose activities "plainly implicate
First Amendment interests. ' 216 Moreover, the Court acknowledged
211. Id. at 1403.
212. Id. In a footnote the court refused to rely on newspapers' long tradition of free-
dom from government intrusion as the basis for differential treatment, calling this argu-
ment a "distinction [which] merely begs the question." Id. at 1405 n.8.
213. See id. at 1400 n.3, 1401 n.4, 1411 n.ll. After denying a petition for rehearing,
the Ninth Circuit tried to cushion its criticism of the 1984 Cable Act by modifying its
opinion slightly. See id. as amended June 13 & 26, 1985, at n.l 1 (amended version avail-
able on WESTLAW, Allfeds library). Unfortunately the last two sentences added to this
footnote by the June 13 & 26 amended version were erroneously printed in the text of
the published opinions (bound version and advance sheets) at 754 F.2d 1410, col. 1.
214. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 S. Ct. 2034, 2036-37
(1986). The Supreme Court specifically affirmed only the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
That court's analysis, however, remains the law of the case and is instructive as to the
constitutional result once a scarcity distinction between cable and broadcasting is no
longer tenable. See Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. at 1465, 1468
n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
215. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2036 n.2. The concurrence emphasized
that the Court's opinion left open two important questions: first, the proper standard
for determining the first amendment status of cable; second, whether cable is sufficiently
analogous to another medium to resolve this issue. Id. at 2038 (Blackmun, Marshall,
O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
216. Id. at 2037. See Best View Cablevision v. Abbeville, No. 85-1159 (4th Cir. Aug.
13, 1986) (in light of Preferred Communications, court reinstates dismissed first amendment
and equal protection claims of cable operator who had been unsuccessful in auction for
exclusive franchise); Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d
1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing, inter alia, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Preferred Communica-
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the analogy between cable and "traditional" media such as newspa-
pers and book publishers, and hinted that cable's first amendment
status surpasses that of broadcasting as long as scarcity allows some
government regulation. 217 Again the implication is clear: since a
unified cable/broadcast medium is not scarce, the freedom of the
print media offers the appropriate constitutional standard for the
cable/broadcast medium.21 8
In an equally important case, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,2 19 the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found the Commission's must-carry
cable requirements "fundamentally at odds with the First Amend-
ment. ' 22 ' Because the Supreme Court has never really addressed
the constitutionality of any cable regulation, 22' the D.C. Circuit first
had to determine the appropriate standard of first amendment re-
view applicable to cable. In particular, the court had to decide
whether to apply the principles governing regulation of broadcast-
ing. It found these principles inapplicable because, although
"[firom the perspective of the viewer, no doubt, cable and broadcast
tions, court holds that purveyor of cable TV service to Air Force base stated valid first
amendment cause of action based on Air Force's award of an exclusive service contract
to another company); Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States, No. 86-79-1-
MAC (M.D. Ga. June 26, 1986) (relying in part on Preferred Communications, court grants
incumbent cable operator preliminary injunction to enjoin defendant air force base from
not renewing its franchise and, instead, granting exclusive franchise to a competitor); cf.
M.N.C. of Hinesville v. United States Dep't of Defense, 791 F.2d 1466, 1470-71 (1 1th
Cir. 1986) (holding government may limit to one the number of commercial, civilian-
published "Civilian Enterprise Newspapers" granted preferred access to a military
base).
217. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2037.
218. Indeed, the Court suggested that the only appropriate occasion for balancing
media first amendment values "against competing societal interests" is "where speech
and conduct are joined in a single course of action," such as in the installation and
maintenance of cable lines and equipment using public utility poles and rights of way. Id.
at 2038. See Century Federal, 648 F. Supp. at 1475-76 (finding that the only asserted gov-
ernmental interest in the regulation of cable which is important or substantial under the
first amendment analysis of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), is the alleged
disruption of the public domain). Just as newspaper delivery trucks are subject to traffic
regulations, so may cable be subject to normal safety and similar controls. See Pacific
West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 798 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1986) ("At the very
least, [the city] may regulate the noncommunicative aspects of cable broadcasting
through reasonable time, place and manner restrictions"; nothing in Preferred Communica-
tions "requires that a municipality open its doors to all cable-television comers, regard-
less of size, shape, quality, qualifications or threat to the ultimate capacity of the
system."). In this sense broadcasting, of course, has even less conduct-related aspects.
The Court's reasoning, therefore, when applied to a unified medium, should preclude
government regulation directly affecting the editorial function.
219. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
220. Id. at 1438.
221. Id. at 1443, 1445.
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television appear virtually indistinguishable, . . . [flor purposes of
First Amendment analysis . . . they differ in at least one critical re-
spect. ' ' 22 2 Once again the critical distinction of "fundamental signif-
icance ' 22 1 was simply the physical scarcity of the broadcast
spectrum which the court quickly concluded "has no place in evalu-
ating government regulation of cable television. 2 24
The court then analyzed the must-carry rules and found them
wanting, even as incidental burdens on speech. But the court ex-
pressed "serious doubts ' 2 25 about not applying even more exacting
scrutiny. Indeed, the court came close to analyzing this cable regu-
lation as it would similar regulation of newspapers-in which case
the regulation would clearly fail.2 2 6 In this context the court ob-
served that "once one has cleared the conceptual hurdle of recog-
nizing that all forms of television need not be treated as a generic
unity for purposes of the First Amendment, the analogy to more
traditional media [i.e. print] is compelling. 227
Thus, in both Preferred Communications and Quincy Cable the cir-
cuit courts precluded cable regulation by distinguishing cable from
broadcasting simply on the basis of scarcity. These opinions, there-
fore, reinforce the conclusion that scarcity is the only constitution-
ally significant difference between cable and broadcasting and that,
without this rationale, the first amendment prohibits most govern-
mental intrusion into the affairs of either medium. Since a unified
cable/broadcast medium is not scarce, the constitutional analogy
between this medium and the print media is, in the words of the
D.C. Circuit, "compelling."
Equally significant, both courts rejected a new generation of
scarcity analysis, based on cable's alleged status as a natural monop-
oly, to justify government regulation.2 28 The natural monopoly ar-
222. Id. at 1448; see also id. at 1450 ("[Bleyond the obvious parallel that both cable
and broadcast television impinge on the senses via a video receiver, the two media differ
in constitutionally significant ways.").
223. Id. at 1448. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-78 (1984)
(stating that scarcity is the "fundamental distinguishing characteristic" of broadcasting).
224. 768 F.2d at 1449.
225. Id. at 1453.
226. See id. at 1452 n.37, 1453.
227. Id. at 1450. Accord Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465
(N.D. Cal. 1986).
228. See 768 F.2d at 1449-50; Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754
F.2d 1396, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986). Since Preferred had
alleged that competition for cable services was economically feasible in its desired re-
gion, and since the court was reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit only as-
sumed without deciding that no natural monopoly existed. Indeed, it changed its
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gument is likely to persist for some time.229 However, broadcasting
can rescue cable from this argument just as cable rescues broadcast-
ing from the scarcity rationale. For, as a viable alternative to cable
for consumers, broadcasting challenges the significance of any mo-
nopolistic characteristics in the distribution of cable. 230 The recent
cable cases thus highlight the vital symbiosis, illustrated in the next
section, between cable and broadcasting.
V. ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS OF DISTINGUISHING CABLE
FROM BROADCASTING
Not only are cable and broadcasting far more similar than dis-
similar, but distinguishing between them is potentially inimical to
their further deregulation and to the movement toward maximum
first amendment freedom for both. Not treating them as a unified
medium perpetuates analytical confusion with inappropriate results.
These adverse effects permeate the range of regulations for each.
Four categories in particular exemplify the problem: regulation
based on the competitive relationship between cable and broadcast-
ing; the fairness doctrine; broadcasting access provisions; and con-
cerns for children's television.2 3'
A. The Competitive Relationship Between Cable and Broadcasting
The history of cable regulation largely reflects the FCC's con-
cern over cable's competitive impact on broadcasting and the poten-
tial harm to the Commission's basic policy of fostering and
original language of "conclude" to "assume." Compare Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d
(advance sheets; decided Mar. 1, 1985) at 1404 with id. (hardbound volume; as corrected
May 20, 1985). The D.C. Circuit in Quincy Cable went further, saying that an economic
scarcity argument for cable "rests on the entirely unproven-and indeed doubtful-as-
sumption that cable operators are in a position to exact monopolistic charges," and sug-
gesting that any tendency toward cable monopoly may be attributable more to the
municipal franchising process than to any economic phenomenon. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d
at 1450. Both courts indicated that, at any rate, Tornillo would preclude reliance on
economic scarcity to justify any denigration of first amendment rights. Quincy Cable, 768
F.2d at 1450; Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404-05; accord Century Federal, 648 F.
Supp. at 1472. But see Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800
F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986).
229. See Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 748 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1986);
Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as
moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
230. See supra Section III.D.
231. As the discussion infra in subsection A shows, distinguishing between the media
is also contrary to thirty years of cable regulation based upon cable's increased similarity
to and effect upon broadcasting.
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protecting local broadcasters who serve local community needs. 2
After initially declining jurisdiction over cable in the late 1950s,23
the Commission soon perceived in the development of cable a
threat to broadcasting, and reacted by asserting jurisdiction and ini-
tiating a series of cable regulations.23" In the continuing absence of
direct statutory authority, the Supreme Court upheld FCC jurisdic-
tion over cable, but only to the extent "reasonably ancillary" to the
Commission's effective regulation of broadcasting.235
The early effect of FCC regulation was to freeze the growth of
cable television.2 36 Various proposals to resolve this situation 237 re-
sulted in the FCC's sweeping 1972 cable rules238 that, in the words
232. See generally Must Carry Rules, supra note 130, at 799-803; 1 CABLE TELEVISION
LAW, supra note 20, 5.04; Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1981). The Commission's policy of localism goes back at least
to its 1952 assignment of television channels. See Table of Television Assignments, 41
F.C.C. 148 (1952).
233. As long as the Commission saw cable simply as a boon to local broadcasters by
enhancing the quality or reach of their signals, it had no problem deciding that it could
not regulate cable as either a common carrier or a broadcaster under the Communica-
tions Act. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 253-54 (1959). See also
Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satellite"
Stations and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting,
26 F.C.C. 403 (1959) (Auxiliary Services Inquiry) (rejecting notion that commission
could derive authority to regulate cable from cable's competitive economic impact on
broadcasting). The Commission, however, unsuccessfully sought legislation giving it
some jurisdiction over cable. See M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 1.04 (rev. ed. 1981).
234. See CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969) (imposing program origination requirements
on cable systems above a certain size), reconsid denied, 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970); Micro-
wave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965) (First Report and Order) (imposing certain
must-carry requirements for local broadcast signals, and rules of nonduplication of local
signals by imported distant ones, on microwave-fed cable systems); Microwave-Served
CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) (Second Report and Order) (imposing must-carry and
nonduplication rules, and restrictions on import of distant broadcast signals into certain
markets, on all cable systems), af'd sub nom. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65
(8th Cir. 1968); Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, 321
F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.) (denying authorization for microwave relay facilities to import dis-
tant broadcast signals to cable system absent showing of no harm to local broadcast
station), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
235. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (upholding FCC's
authority to promulgate restrictions on distant signals); see also United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (Midwest Video I) (plurality upheld program
origination rules as reasonably ancillary; concurrence noted that FCC's position strained
the outer limits of its jurisdiction).
236. See 1 CABLE TELEVISION LAw, supra note 20, at 5.05; Besen & Crandall, supra
note 232, at 93.
237. See 1 CABLE TELEVISION LAw, supra note 20, at 5.05; Besen & Crandall, supra
note 232, at 93-95.
238. Amendment of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to Community
Antenna Television Systems, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, reconsid., 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972), aff'd sub
nom. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
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of one commentator, "can only be described as baroque. "239 While
the rules relaxed some restrictions on cable, they perpetuated the
policy of protecting broadcasting from audience fragmentation by
cable, which it was feared could destroy free broadcast television.
The FCC clearly relegated cable to secondary status, considering it
merely a supplement to broadcasting.2 40
The 1972 rules proved unwieldy and difficult to enforce. This,
together with a general trend toward deregulation and increasing
judicial doubts about the extent of FCC jurisdiction over cable,2 4 '
led to a substantial reduction of restrictions on cable during the rest
of the 197 0s. 24 2 In 1979 the Commission completed an exhaustive
reexamination of the economic relationship between cable and
broadcasting, 243 concluding that cable did not pose a significant
threat to overall broadcasting policies.244 Quite the contrary, the
Commission found that the developing relationship between cable
and broadcasting, coupled with further deregulation of cable, ,would
stimulate beneficial competition between the media both in tie eco-
nomic marketplace and in the marketplace of ideas.2 4 5
In sum, over the course of two decades the FCC moved from
239. Besen & Crandall, supra note 232, at 95. These rules governed such matters as
must-carry of certain local and other "significantly viewed" broadcast signals, distant
signal importation, nonduplication of certain network programming, program origina-
tion, minimum channel capacity, access channels, and certain other technical
requirements.
240. The courts soon criticized the Commission's policy of placing cable in a
subordinate role relative to broadcasting. See HBO v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 25, 36 (D.C.
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
24 1. See id. To sustain its cable regulations the FCC was required, at a minimum, to
demonstrate that the objectives of such regulations were those for which it legitimately
could regulate broadcast media, and when the first amendment was involved, the Com-
mission was also required to state clearly the harm its regulations sought to remedy and
its reasons for supposing harm exists; on this basis the court in HBO v. FCC held that pay
cable "antisiphoning" rules were invalid. Id. at 34. See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979) (Midwest Video II) (holding cable access and channel
capacity requirements beyond FCC's ancillary jurisdiction over cable; describing first
amendment questions about such rules as "not frivolous").
242. See 1 CABLE TELEVISION LAw, supra note 20, at 5.05 [6]-[10]; Besen & Crandall,
supra note 232, at 98-100.
243. CATV Economic Impact, 65 F.C.C.2d 9 (1977), (Notice of Inquiry); Economic
Relationship Between TV Broadcasting & CATV, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979) (Economic
Report).
244. Economic Report, supra note 243, at 661.
245. Id. at 714. The Commission then repealed its cable rules on distant signal car-
riage and syndicated program exclusivity. CATV Syndicated Program, Exclusivity
Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), aff'dsub nom. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140




essentially ignoring cable, to suffocating regulation, to substantial
deregulation.246 In each case the Commission based its position
primarily on its conception of cable's relationship with, and particu-
larly its growing competitive similarity to, broadcast television. In
implementing economic deregulation the Commission has increas-
ingly relied on cable as a competitor and substitute for broadcasting
to assure adequate diversity in the electronic video marketplace. 247
With the passage of the 1984 Cable Act the symbiotic relation-
ship between cable and broadcasting again features prominently in
deregulation. In lobbying for the legislation, a major concern for
the cable industry was to achieve deregulation of the rates charged
to subscribers.248 This was more than just a pocketbook issue for
the industry since, as the history of FCC "raised eyebrow" regula-
tion of broadcasting demonstrates, economic power in the form of
licensing or rate regulation often breeds more pervasive and intru-
sive control.24 9 Through a lobbying compromise 250 the Cable Act
grandfathered for two years existing rate regulations. Thereafter, it
deregulates all rates except those for "basic cable service in circum-
stances in which a cable system is not subject to effective competi-
tion. '2 1  For purposes of this statute the Commission has
determined that a cable system is subject to effective competition252
246. Besen & Crandall, supra note 232, at 122.
247. See, e.g., Multiple Ownership (Seven Stations Rule) 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 859,
864-65 (1984) (revoking "seven stations rule" and relaxing restrictions on multiple own-
ership of radio and broadcast television stations), reconsid, granted in part, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 966, appeal docketed sub nom. National Ass'n of Black Owned Broadcasters v. FCC,
No. 85-1139 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 4, 1985). The Commission noted that its cable and
television cross-ownership prohibitions would make little sense unless the two media
were "important substitutes" for each other. 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 865. See also
Must Carry Rules, supra note 130, at 827.
248. See Free At Last: Cable Gets Its Bill, BROADCASTING, Oct. 15, 1984, at 38-39; Cable
and Cities On Hold Again, BROADCASTING, Sept. 24, 1984, at 38; NCTA-Cities Set to Try
Again, BROADCASTING, Sept. 17, 1984, at 31-32.
249. See Noam, supra note 145, at 367-68. For the genesis of FCC regulation by
"raised eyebrow," see 1 CABLE TELEVISION LAw, supra note 20, at 3.11 n.5. See also
Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Bazelon, C.J., stating why he voted to grant rehearing en banc).
250. The compromise was effected after the Supreme Court's decision in Capital Cit-
ies Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984), confirmed a trend toward federal preemp-
tion of cable regulation that, absent legislation, threatened to rob cities of much local
control over cable operators. Compare Cable Strikes a Deal With the Cities, BROADCASTING,
June 4, 1985, at 39 (pre-Crisp) with NCTA-Cities Set to Try Again, supra note 248 (post-
Crisp).
251. 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
252. The Commission used the normal antitrust market-definition approach of con-
sidering the cross-elasticity of demand between basic cable and other comparable pro-
gramming services to define effective competition-that is, it considered the alternatives
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in the provision of basic cable services 253 whenever the franchise
market receives three or more unduplicated broadcast signals. 254
The FCC estimates that its regulations will free approximately
eighty percent of all cable systems, serving more than ninety percent
of all cable subscribers, from local rate regulation. 255
Thus, the Commission has again used the similarity and inter-
changeability between broadcasting and cable 25 6 to afford cable sig-
nificant autonomy with regard to subscription rates and the broader
reasonably available to consumers. Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Imple-
ment Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,765,
48,770-71 (1984) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (Report and Order), 58 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1, 24-34 (1985), reconsid. denied, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 514 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Amendment of Commission's Rules-Cable Act]. Several appeals are pending. See,
e.g., ACLU v. FCC, 774 F.2d 24 (lst Cir. 1985). See also HousE COMM. ON ENERGY &
COMMERCE, CABLE COMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. III (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4655,
4662, 4703 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 934]. Regarding the antitrust concept, see
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956), and R.
POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 347-85 (2d ed. 1981).
253. Although the statute speaks in terms of effective competition for a "cable sys-
tem," the legislative history indicates that the Commission was to focus on determining
whether there is effective competition for basic cable services and not for other video or
mass media services. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 248, at 4703. See also Amendment of
Commission's Rules-Cable Act, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 25-26. The focus on basic
cable comports with the growing importance of that portion of cable services. See Back to
Basic, CABLEVISION, Oct. 14, 1985, at 28. Although § 602(2) of the 1984 Cable Act [47
U.S.C. § 522(2)] defines basic cable service generally as "any service tier which includes
the retransmission of local television broadcast signals," the Commission had flexibility
to fashion an appropriate definition for the purposes of rate deregulation. H.R. REP.
No. 934, supra note 252, at 4703. The Commission originally defined basic cable service
in terms of the tier of service that includes all must-carry broadcast television signals and
PEG access channels, if any. Amendment of Commission's Rules-Cable Act, 58 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) at 33. After the must-carry requirements were found unconstitutional,
the Commission reformulated its definition of basic cable service to specify the same
signals by referencing the characteristics that previously qualified them for must-carry
status. Id., 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 522-23 (1986) (Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der); Definition of Cable Television System, Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) (Current Service)
85:5 (June 18, 1986).
254. Amendment of Commission's Rules-Cable Act, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 27,
60 Rad. Reg. (P & F) at 522.
255. FCC Settles on "Three or More" Standard of Effective Competition, CABLEVISION, Apr.
15, 1985, at 11. See also Hazlett, supra note 148, at 1388 n.187 (87% of cable systems
have been released from regulation under the effective competition standard).
256. This approach for basic cable underlies the treatment of cable services generally.
The effective competition concept in the 1984 Cable Act involves only basic cable serv-
ices because nonbasic services already are free from rate regulation. This in turn is
primarily because nonbasic services already are subject to sufficient competition from
alternative video delivery systems, including broadcast signals. See Amendment of Com-
mission's Rules--Cable Act, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 25-26.
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25control that often accompanies such economic power. 25 Sugges-
tions of significant distinctions between cable and broadcasting
needlessly compromise the necessary predicate for this approach.
More specifically, they challenge the fundamental notions of compa-
rability and a competitive relationship, thereby undermining the ba-
sis for the freedom granted cable in the deregulatory era. 58
B. The Fairness Doctrine
Broadly speaking, the concept of fairness on the air has its gen-
esis in section 18 of the 1927 Radio Act, later incorporated into the
1934 Communications Act as section 315.259 This equal opportuni-
ties provision gives political candidates a contingent right to equal
"use" of a broadcast station triggered by a licensee's allowing an
opposing candidate to use its station. The FRC, however, immedi-
ately extended the contingent equal opportunities concept by re-
quiring licensees to air diverse views and ideas on matters of public
importance.260 A corollary of this obligation, derived from the pub-
lic interest standard, was that stations had to present programming
addressed to the needs and interests of the general population and
not just those of a limited group or class.26'
The Commission's stress on the affirmative fairness obligations
of broadcasters 262 culminated in its 1949 Report on Editorializ-
ing. 263 In that report the Commission announced what generally is
referred to as the fairness doctrine, namely a two-part obligation of
broadcasters to: (i) "devote a reasonable percentage of their broad-
casting time to the discussion of public issues of interest" to their
257. See G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND &J. MERCURIO, CABLESPEECH-THE CASE FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION 158, 166-71 (1983).
258. The potential for change in the current deregulation is embodied in § 623(h) of
the 1984 Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 543(h) (Supp. III 1985). Under this section the Com-
mission must report to Congress within six years on rate regulation and the effect of
competition in the marketplace and submit any appropriate legislative recommenda-
tions. Any resurgence of arguments distinguishing cable from broadcasting might
therefore prove detrimental to cable interests. See also Amendment of Commission's
Rules-Cable Act, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 35-36.
259. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927); Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982)).
260. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32, 33-34 (1929).
261. Chicago Fed'n of Labor, 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 36 (1929), aff'd, 41 F.2d 422 (D.C.
Cir. 1930); Young People's Ass'n for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178, 181
(1938).
262. See Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940); United Broadcast-
ing Co. (WHKC), 10 F.C.C. 515, 517-18 (1945); In re Petition of Robert Harold Scott, 11
F.C.C. 372, 376 (1946).
263. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
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local community, and (ii) to do so in such a manner "that the public
has a reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing positions
on the public issues of interest and importance" in that commu-
nity.264 In 1974 the Commission generally reaffirmed the fairness
doctrine. 65 But with continuing doubts about the doctrine's wis-
dom and efficacy,266 particularly in view of dramatic changes in the
electronic media, the Commission initiated a new "searching and
comprehensive" inquiry into the general fairness doctrine obliga-
tions of broadcast licensees in 1984.267
With respect to cable, the Commission first applied the fairness
doctrine in 1969 when it required systems above a minimum size to
originate programming.2 68 Although the Supreme Court upheld
mandatory program origination,26 9 the Commission subsequently
repealed this requirement 270 and therefore never sought to enforce
264. Id. at 1257-58. See Fairness Doctrine, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1985). For a general
discussion of the fairness doctrine, see F. ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS (1984) and S.
SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA (1978). See also Fairness Doctrine, 40
F.C.C. 598 (1964) (Fairness Doctrine Primer) (setting forth the fairness doctrine rights,
obligations, and responsibilities of broadcast licensees).
265. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), reconsid denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded in part sub nom. National Citizens Comm. for Broad-
casting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978), on
remand, Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, 74 F.C.C.2d 163 (1979) (Report and Order), reconsid.
denied, 89 F.C.C.2d 916 (1982). The Commission restated the fairness doctrine,
"stripped to its barest essentials," as involving a two-fold duty: "(1) the broadcaster
must devote a reasonable percentage of this [sic] broadcast time to the coverage of pub-
lic issues; and (2) his coverage of these issues must be fair in the sense that it provides an
opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of view." 48 F.C.C.2d at 7.
266. Broadcast deregulatory legislation to repeal the fairness doctrine, among other
matters, has been introduced in Congress since at least 1975. See 133 CONG. REC. S247
(daily ed. Jan. 8, 1987) (statement of Senator Proxmire made on Jan. 6, 1987, mention-
ing pertinent legislation introduced since 1975); Freedom of Expression Act of 1983, S.
1917, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Freedom of Expression Act of 1985, S. 1038, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); First Amendment Clarification Act of 1987, S. 22, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987). For a description of the fate of the 1983 bill, see Packwood s FEA Fails
First Test, BROADCASTING, June 18, 1984, at 32, and CONG. Q., June 16, 1984, at 1435.
Even the Supreme Court has suggested it might be time to reexamine the constitutional
basis of the fairness doctrine. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 n.12
(1984).
267. 1984 Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317, 20,318 (1984).
268. Amendment of Commission's CATV Rules and Regulations, 20 F.C.C.2d 201,
208-09 (1969) (First Report and Order). For an overview of fairness doctrine obliga-
tions for cable systems, see Amendment of the Commission's Rules Concerning the
Fairness Doctrine and Political Cablecasting Requirements, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,472 (June 8,
1983) [hereinafter Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine).
269. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (Midwest Video I).
270. Cable Television Service, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1976).
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the first prong of the fairness doctrine against cable. 27' The fairness
doctrine otherwise remains applicable to cable systems engaging in
"origination cablecasting"-that is, programming, other than
broadcast signals, subject to the exclusive control of the cable
operator.2 72
Over the years the Commission has viewed the fairness doctrine
as one of the most important pieces of federal regulation.273 On the
other hand, licensees see it as one of the most onerous and chilling
requirements. Indeed, the Commission devotes a good portion of
its 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report to chronicling the adverse effects
of the doctrine upon broadcasters.274 These effects include the inhi-
bition of both controversial programming and the expression of un-
orthodox opinion, the threat of government sanctions to coerce or
limit certain programming, and the financial burdens created by the
doctrine.275 Rescinding or significantly relaxing the doctrine would
271. Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at
26,474 n.3.
272. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.205 (origination cablecasts by candidates for public office),
§ 76.209 (fairness doctrine; personal attacks; political editorials), and § 76.5 (r) (origina-
tion cablecasting) (1985). The meaning of "exclusive control" in this context is unclear,
except that broadcast signals and most access channel programming, prior to the 1984
Cable Act, were not considered subject to exclusive control for this purpose. Amend-
ment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at 26,475, 26,482. The
Commission has suggested that the fairness doctrine provisions were meant to apply
only to local program origination by cable operators and not to "cable distributed pro-
gramming over which the system operator retains no practical day-to-day editorial con-
trol." Id. at 26,482.
Under the 1984 Cable Act both PEG and leased access channels should also not
entail fairness doctrine obligations for the cable operator since they remain outside the
operator's editorial control. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985). The
1984 Cable Act otherwise does not appear to affect fairness doctrine obligations for
cable operators, and the Commission's authority for such regulations depends on other
statutory provisions. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(c) and the discussion of § 315 infra, subsection
C. Even prior to its 1984 reexamination of the fairness doctrine for broadcasting, how-
ever, the Commission proposed a significant relaxation of cable operators' fairness obli-
gations. Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268.
273. In its 1974 Fairness Report, the Commission reaffirmed its view that "strict ad-
herence" to the doctrine is " 'the single most important requirement of operation in the
public interest-the 'sine qua non' for grant of a renewal of license.'" Fairness Report,
48 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1974) (quoting Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial
Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283, 292 (1970)). See also 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note
2, at 162; Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
274. 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 159-96.
275. Id. In a recent and ominous development, the Commission, while denying the
underlying claim, upheld a staff ruling granting a government agency standing to bring a
fairness doctrine complaint, including an allegation of deliberate news distortion,
against a television network. CIA v. ABC, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1543, 1544 n.l
(1985) (Staff Ruling), 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1544, 1548-49 (1985) (Memorandum
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greatly extend the first amendment freedom of the electronic media,
making it more commensurate with that of the print media. The
Commission's current proposals in this regard exemplify the impor-
tance of not erecting largely artificial distinctions between cable and
broadcasting.
Since the fairness doctrine is premised on a scarcity ration-
ale,276 the Commission's 1985 Fairness Report questions the contin-
uing need for the doctrine in light of the great increase in the
amount and type of information sources available in the communi-
cations marketplace.27 7 The Commission not only stresses the tre-
mendous growth and development of both radio and broadcast
television, but also relies on the availability of various alternate elec-
tronic technologies, especially cable, as an important supplement to
traditional broadcasting.2 7 s Indeed, framing the issue as "whether
or not there are inherent differences among various media outlets
so as to prevent substitutability with respect to the presentation of
controversial issues of public importance, ' 279 the Commission reaf-
firms its earlier conclusion 2 0 of the fungibility of cable and broad-
casting and the "significant degree of substitutability" between
them.28 l
The Commission's most recent proposals for dealing with the
Opinion and Order). The CIA declined to seek judicial review of its underlying claim.
A "media watch dog" organization tried to pursue the matter but was found to lack
standing to obtain a review of the Commission's decision. American Legal Found. v.
FCC, 808 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In practice, on the other hand, the fairness rules have been described as a "legal
placebo" because of the infrequent number of adverse rulings under the doctrine. Muel-
ler, Repeal the Fairness Doctrine by Enforcing It, Wall St.J., Apr. 2, 1985, at 28, col. 3 (east-
ern ed.). Between 1973 and 1976, of the approximately 50,000 fairness complaints filed
with the Commission, only 244 led to inquiries and of these only 54, or 0.1% of the total
number of complaints, resulted in adverse rulings. Id. See also F. ROWAN, supra note 264,
at 51-70. In only one instance has the FCC sustained a complaint relating to the first
part of the fairness doctrine, 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 160 n.59,
179 n.131, and only once has it denied a license renewal on the basis of a fairness doc-
trine violation, id. at 163 n.75.
276. 1984 Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317, 20,325 (1984). See also I
CABLE TELEVISION LAW, supra note 20, at 3.13[l].
277. 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 196-226. In addition, the Com-
mission concludes that the transformation of the broadcast marketplace since Red Lion
renders the continuing constitutionality of the doctrine questionable. Id. at 148-57.
The Commission further stated that in operation the fairness doctrine inhibits rather
than promotes first amendment values, making it inappropriate at any rate. Id. at 158-
96.
278. Id. at 202-18.
279. Id. at 199.
280. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
281. 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 211, 219-20.
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fairness doctrine obligations of cable operators provide a good test
of the applicability of this conclusion. The Commission has recog-
nized that cable's lack of scarcity makes it difficult to sustain the im-
position of fairness obligations.282 Instead, capitalizing on cable's
multi-channel capacity and its potential for broad public access, 283
the Commission has proposed developing rules to allow a cable op-
erator to satisfy its fairness doctrine obligations by providing cable-
cast opportunities on channels specifically set aside for the
presentation of programming not under the operator's control.2 84
The PEG or leased access channels provided for in the 1984 Cable
Act might satisfy this scheme.28 5
Thus, the FCC has found cable to be a competitor and substi-
tute for broadcasting and, as such, to be an important element in its
argument for eliminating fairness obligations for broadcasters. Sim-
ilarly, it has relied on cable's capacity for increased diversity and
access in proposing to allow cable operators to substitute access op-
portunities for their fairness obligations. However, if the Commis-
sion seriously believes in the high degree of interchangeability
between cable and broadcasting, it should use its cable approach to
modify the fairness doctrine for both media. For example, given the
wide availability and increasing importance of basic cable service,
the FCC might allow suitable access provisions, located anywhere
on the broadcast/basic cable dial, as a proper substitute for the
broadcast/cable fairness doctrine.
286
282. Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at
26,476-78.
283. See 1984 Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317, 20,327, 20,335 (1984).
Cf. Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, 74 F.C.C.2d 163, 171 (1979) (Report and Order) ("The
Fairness Doctrine signifies a focus upon access of the public to 'ideas' rather than upon
access of particular individuals to a broadcast forum .... [A]ny system which has its
emphasis on speakers rather than on ideas is at cross-purposes to that of the Fairness
Doctrine."), reconsid denied, 89 F.C.C.2d 916 (1982).
284. Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at
26,473, 26,479-82.
285. As the Commission recognized, there are several problems with access opportu-
nities as a replacement for fairness doctrine obligations, not the least of which are the
substantial constitutional issues raised by mandatory access. See supra notes 137-139 and
accompanying text. The Commission's proposal, however, involves a cable operator's
voluntarily allowing access as one means of satisfying its fairness obligations. If truly
voluntary (see Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at
26,482), this may be a very attractive alternative, especially as more cable systems de-
velop greater channel capacity making such access somewhat less burdensome.
286. See Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at
26,482. The real issue here is whether a suitable audience will be available so that access
provisions can adequately effectuate fairness doctrine goals. In this regard, the Com-
mission has already emphasized that in the "rough and tumble marketplace for the pres-
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The simplest and optimal approach is to eliminate the fairness
doctrine entirely based, at least in part, on cable's having put an end
to any scarcity. But despite the FCC's recent criticism of the doc-
trine on constitutional, policy, and practical grounds, it deferred to
Congress for any repeal or modification of the fairness doctrine.28 7
Congress, however, is unlikely to tolerate significant dismantling of
the doctrine,2 8 and the Supreme Court would have to reverse its
well-established position to void the doctrine on constitutional
grounds. 289 A more palatable, midway position might be to rely on
less onerous, though still problematic, cable access provisions as a
entation of competing viewpoints" it does not have to guarantee absolute equality of
exposure. Id. at 26,481. Rather, it might suffice if "periods of equal audience potential
were made available with the responsibility for the size of the actual audience left with
the party responsible for the program." Id. (emphasis in original).
287. The Commission concluded that while the fairness doctrine was not part of the
1934 Communications Act and does not necessarily inhere in the public interest stan-
dard, Congress may have codified the doctrine in its 1959 amendment to the Act. 1985
Fairness Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 227; see infra note 292. Moreover, as a practi-
cal political matter the FCC cannot act on the fairness doctrine without congressional
support. Indeed, the Commission recently attempted other sorts of deregulation only to
retreat in the face of stiff congressional opposition. See Goodale, Summer Storm, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Six-Month Ban on TV-Show Ownership Rule Changes is Approved in
House Vote, Wall St.J., Nov. 9, 1983, at 20, col. 1. Furthermore, as part of its continuing
appropriations for fiscal 1987, Congress has required the FCC to consider alternative
means of administering and enforcing the fairness doctrine and to report to Congress
before making any change in the doctrine. Conference Report to accompany H.J. Res.
738, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 70-71, 430-31, reprinted in 132 CONG. REC., 10,619, 10,720
(daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986). See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 873 n.ll (D.C. Cir.
1987).
288. See supra note 287; Fight Over Rule is Seen in Courts, Not Congress, N.Y. Times, Aug.
8, 1985, at C22, col. 1 (late ed.).
289. Nonetheless, court challenges are pending. In late 1984 the FCC issued its first
finding of a fairness doctrine violation in several years. Syracuse Peace Council v. Tele-
vision Station WTVH, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 519 (1984), reconsid denied, 59 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 179 (1985). Upon review, the D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the matter to
the FCC with instructions to consider constitutional challenges to the fairness doctrine,
unless the Commission concludes it may not or should not enforce the doctrine because
it is contrary to the public interest. Meredith, 809 F.2d 863. Ironically, the petitioner in
Meredith relied heavily on the Commission's 1985 Fairness Doctrine Report to argue the
doctrine's unconstitutionality. See Brief of Petitioner Meredith Corporation, Meredith
Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 85-1723). Following Meredith the
Commission issued its Order Requesting Comment, supra note 2.
In a companion case, Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860
(D.C. Cir. 1987), the court found it lacked jurisdiction to review petitioners' challenge to
the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine brought in light of the 1985 Fairness Doc-
trine Report. Such a claim must be brought in district court. Id. at 862-63. The D.C.
Court of Appeals will review, however, petitioners' nonconstitutional claim that the
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to institute rulemaking to elimi-
nate or modify the fairness doctrine. Id. at 863.
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reasonable substitute for any cable or broadcast29 ° fairness obliga-
tions. In any case, the predicate for relaxing the fairness doctrine is
the similarity and close interchangeability of cable and broadcasting.
C. Broadcasting Access Regulations
The importance of maintaining the close similarity between
cable and broadcasting with respect to the fairness doctrine applies
as well to the corollary access requirements imposed on broadcast-
ers. These can be divided into contingent and affirmative access
obligations.
The major contingent access provision is section 315(a) of the
Communications Act, requiring equal broadcast opportunities for
political candidates upon the use of a broadcast station by an oppos-
ing candidate.2"' The argument that Congress' 1959 amendment to
section 315(a) also may have codified the general fairness doctrine
obligations demonstrates the intimate relationship between the stat-
ute and the doctrine.29 2 The Supreme Court has further empha-
290. Several years ago the Commission rejected a proposal to develop access provi-
sions for broadcasting as a substitute for broadcasters' fairness obligations. Fairness
Doctrine Inquiry, 74 F.C.C.2d 163 (1979), reconsid. denied, 89 F.C.C.2d 916 (1982). Its
rejection, however, was based not on any inherent characteristics of broadcasting, but
rather on issues common to broadcasting and cable. 74 F.C.C.2d at 172. The Commis-
sion's more recent fairness doctrine proposals for cable thus indicate that its earlier
reservations are no longer an impediment. See Amendment of Commission's Rules-
Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at 26,482.
291. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (Supp. III 1985). Section 315(b) places restrictions on the
fees that can be charged for such uses. See also 1984 Political Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476
(1984); Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209 (1978); Use of
Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510
(1972); Licensee Responsibility as to Political Broadcasts, 15 F.C.C.2d 94 (1968); 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.1940 (broadcasting contingent access requirements for public office candi-
dates), 76.205 (same for cablecasting) (1986).
292. The 1959 amendment to § 315 created four categories of news broadcasts which
qualified as exceptions to a "use" of a station by a political candidate that otherwise
would trigger the equal opportunities provision. Congress also provided that nothing in
the amendment creating those exceptions "shall be construed as relieving broadcasters
... from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on
issues of public importance." Act approved Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat.
55 (1959) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (Supp. III 1985)). This language
is the basis for the argument that Congress codified the two-part fairness doctrine. The
Commission recently reviewed various possible constructions of this language and sur-
veyed the arguments both for and against congressional codification. 1985 Fairness
Doctrine Report, supra note 2, at 227-46. The Commission avoided a definitive conclu-
sion on this issue by deferring action on the fairness doctrine to Congress. The D.C.
Court of Appeals, however, in an opinion joined by Judge (now Justice) Scalia, recently
found the doctrine to be an "administrative construction, not a binding statutory direc-
tive." Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517,
[VOL. 46:212
THE SIGNAL CABLE SENDS
sized this relationship by noting that a party could easily circumvent
the goals of section 315 if the complementary obligations of the fair-
ness doctrine did not exist.2
9 3
The FCC's personal attack and political editorial rules, first
promulgated in 1967,94 comprise a second kind of contingent ac-
cess provision. Subject to a few exceptions, the former requires a
licensee to give an individual, whose "personal qualities" are at-
tacked over the air "during the presentation of views on a contro-
versial issue of public importance," notice and a description of the
attack and a reasonable opportunity to respond.295 The latter re-
quires a station that editorially opposes or endorses a candidate for
public office to give an opposing or unendorsed candidate notice
and an opportunity to respond.296 Although the Court in Red Lion
placed these rules on the same constitutional level as section 315
and the fairness doctrine,2 97 it also recognized that they are more
reh k en banc denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (1986). Moreover, another panel of that court has told
the Commission that the FCC is obliged to resolve this issue despite intense political
pressure from Congress. Meredith, 809 F.2d at 874.
The situation is analogous with respect to cable. For purposes of § 315, subsection
(c) includes cable systems within the definition of broadcast stations. (Subsection (c) was
added as § 315(f) by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
Tit.I, § 104(c), 86 Stat. 3, 7 (1972) and amended to its current version as § 315(c) by the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, Tit. IV,
§ 402, 88 Stat. 1263, 1291 (1974)). Thus, codification of the fairness doctrine should
apply equally to cable and broadcasting. The Commission has suggested, however, that
the expansion of § 315 to cover cable was done without extended consideration or dis-
cussion and that, while Congress intended to apply the equal opportunities principle to
cable, it is uncertain whether it also meant to subject cable to general fairness doctrine
obligations. Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at
26,475-76. Moreover, the Commission has indicated that even if the fairness doctrine is
applicable to cable, it should cover only local program origination and not the bulk of
cable programming over which the cable operator retains no practical editorial content.
Id. at 26,482.
293. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1969).
294. The Commission's 1949 Fairness Report, which allowed broadcasters to editori-
alize, foreshadowed these provisions by suggesting that, in choosing a spokesperson for
a particular point of view, a licensee should give special consideration to the person or
group specifically attacked over the station. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,
13 F.C.C. 1246, 1252 (1949).
295. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1920 (broadcasting), 76.209(b)-(c) (origination cablecasting)
(1985).
296. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1930 (broadcasting), 76.209(d) (cable) (1985). Both kinds of
rules were adopted in Personal Attacks and Political Editorials, 8 F.C.C.2d 721 (1967).
See also Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 48
Fed. Reg. 28,295 (1983) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
297. "In terms of constitutional principle, and as enforced sharing of a scarce re-
source, the personal attack and political editorial rules are indistinguishable from the
equal-time provision of § 315 . . . to which the fairness doctrine and these constituent
regulations are important complements." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391.
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invasive of editorial discretion since the licensee lacks the option to
choose the responding party's spokespersons.298
Both section 315 and the personal attack and political editorial
rules are only contingent rights of access because, to the extent it
can do so and still fulfill general fairness doctrine obligations, a
broadcaster can avoid programming that will trigger a right of re-
sponse. Section 312(a)(7), on the other hand, is an affirmative right
of access. It provides that the FCC may revoke a license for "willful
or repeated failure" to allow legally qualified candidates for federal
elective office "reasonable" access to or use of a broadcast station
on behalf of their candidacies. 99
Each of these access provisions, impermissible if applied to the
print media, is subject to attack as an unwarranted intrusion into the
editorial discretion of broadcasters as well. The Supreme Court,
however, upheld section 312 (a)(7) as a limited right to "reasonable"
access which "properly balances the First Amendment rights of fed-
eral candidates, the public and broadcasters. '30 0 Moreover, in Red
Lion the Court not only sustained the personal attack and political
editorial rules but noted that section 315 was part of the law since
298. Id. at 378. See also CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 105, 116 (1973).
299. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (Supp. III 1985). See also Commission Policy in Enforcing
Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079 (1978); Broadcasts by
Candidates for Public Office, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940 (1985). This affirmative access provi-
sion was added by § 103(a)(2)(A) of Title I of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). Since § 104(c) of this Act added current
subsection (c) to § 315, making § 315 applicable to cable, § 312(a)(7) originally was
taken to apply to cable systems as well, at least to the extent that cable systems had
facilities to provide access to candidates. See Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities
by Candidates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 511 n.2 (1972); Amendment of Com-
mission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at 26,475 n.29. Although the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, Tit. II, § 205(b),
88 Stat. 1263 (1974), repealed Title I of the 1971 Act, it did so without amending or
discussing § 312(a)(7). Thus, this section is considered still effective. Carter-Mondale
Presidential Comm., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 637 n.4, reconsid denied, 74 F.C.C.2d 657
(1979), aff'd sub nom. CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 367
(1981); see also CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 384 n.9 (1981). The Commission, however,
does not currently apply § 312(a)(7) to cable systems. Subscription Video Services, Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) (Current Service) 53:399, 53:407 n.27 (Jan. 8, 1986) (Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking).
At the same time Congress imposed the affirmative access obligation of § 312(a)(7),
it adopted a conforming amendment to § 315(a). Section 315(a) had stated that a licen-
see has no obligation to allow a political candidate initial use of the station. The con-
forming amendment limited this language to § 315(a), thereby avoiding any conflict
with § 3 12 (a)( 7 ). See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 381-82.
300. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 396-97. See also Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC,
636 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that § 312(a)(7) does not entitle candidate to
free broadcast time).
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the 1927 Radio Act and its constitutionality has been "unques-
tioned."' 30 ' Nonetheless, while the FCC cannot repeal the statutory
provisions,302 it has proposed repealing its personal attack and
political editorial rules.30 3  The Commission has further demon-
strated its dim view of the equal opportunities provisions by propos-
ing ways to limit their disruptive effect, at least for cable systems. 30 4
As with the fairness doctrine, all of these provisions fundamen-
tally are premised on a scarcity rationale.30 5 Indeed, Tornillo makes
clear that in the absence of the sort of physical scarcity thought to
limit the airwaves, government cannot impose on the media the ob-
ligation to afford access as a right of response.30 6 Cable, as the
death-knell for broadcast scarcity, should thus end the justification
for these statutes and rules, freeing both media. Therefore, much
of the FCC's discussion in its current Fairness Doctrine Report con-
cerning the transformation of the electronic communications mar-
ketplace and cable's contribution to that transformation undercuts
the need for and the policy supporting the current access
307provisions.
301. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391. See also Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, 360
U.S. 525 (1959).
302. There have been several recent congressional attempts at repeal. See sources
cited supra note 266; First Amendment Clarification Act of 1985, S. 22, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985). See also CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 384 n.9.
303. Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rule, supra
note 296. This applies to cable as well as broadcasting. Id. at 28,301 n.31. The
Supreme Court seems to have confirmed the Commission's discretion to abandon the
rules, but expressed no opinion on the legality of such action. FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 n.12 (1984). For critical examinations of the rules, see B.
SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 186; Simmons, The FCC's Personal Attack and Political Editorial
Rules Reconsidered, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 990 (1977).
304. Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268. The
Commission also has been construing the exemptions of § 315(a) more liberally, even
for broadcasters. See, e.g., American Broadcasting Cos., 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 843
(1985) (Staff Ruling) ("Ray Briem Program" exempt as bona fide news interview);
American Broadcasting Cos., 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1659 (1984) (Staff Ruling) (same,
"Michael Jackson Program"); Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
956 (1984) (Staff Ruling) (same, "Larry King Show"); National Broadcasting Co., 56
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 958 (1984) (Staff Ruling) (same, "Summer Sunday USA"); Mul-
timedia Entertainment, Inc., 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 143 (1984) (same, "Donahue"
program); In re Henry Geller, 95 F.C.C.2d 1236 (1983), aff'd sub nom. League of Women
Voters Educ. Fund v. FCC, 731 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (broadcaster-sponsored de-
bates between political candidates are within the exemptions from the equal opportunity
requirements of § 315).
305. See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 394-97; CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94, 101, 125 (1973);
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-401; Amendment of Commission's Rules-Fairness Doctrine,
supra note 268, at 26,476.
306. See also CBS V. DNC, 412 U.S. at 117-18.
307. See supra note 277. However, the Commission specifically excluded the personal
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Indeed, both the contingent and affirmative access provisions
are, if anything, more susceptible to attack based on the advent of
cable than is the general fairness doctrine. While cable access may
well approximate the fairness doctrine scheme of adequate and fair
coverage of important or controversial issues, it even more directly
and perfectly satisfies whatever meritorious policies underlie the
current access provisions. After all, if cable and broadcasting are
fungible, access is access wherever on the dial provided. Public or
leased access channels on cable, however, may be less problematic
and less intrusive into editorial functions than the current contin-
gent and affirmative access provisions.3 '8
The Commission has appreciated this point, at least to the ex-
tent of proposing, in lieu of directly applying section 315 to cable,
that it should consider cable operators who provide suitable access
to have fulfilled their section 315 obligations.3 0 9 The same reason-
ing should generally encompass all the current contingent and af-
firmative access provisions and be applied to the concept of a
unified cable/broadcasting medium. In this way, cable, as the end of
scarcity, supports the outright repeal of the present statutes and
rules for both cable and broadcasting. Short of such repeal, suitable
public or leased cable access requirements can replace the present
provisions. Either way, there is no reason to contradict such a bene-
ficial, unified approach by mislabeling cable as fundamentally dis-
tinct from broadcasting.
D. Children's Television
A final example of the importance of maintaining the similarity
between cable and broadcasting involves a particular concern about
children's television. While there have been longstanding concerns
over the content310 and commercialization 31' of programming
attack and political editorial rules from the scope of its fairness doctrine review, 1984
Fairness Doctrine Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317, 20,319 n.10 (1984), perhaps because it
already had recommended their repeal or modification.
308. For a discussion of this comparison, see Amendment of Commission's Rules-
Fairness Doctrine, supra note 268, at 26,480-81.
309. Id.
310. In the fall of 1974 the Chairman of the FCC began meeting with executives of
the three major networks to urge them to self-regulate violent and sexually-oriented
programming available to children. See Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene
Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975). Such meetings resulted in the adoption of the "family
viewing" amendment to the National Association of Broadcasters' Television Code
(NAB Code) by which programming inappropriate for a general family audience was
channelled to later evening hours. See Inclusion in the NAB Television Code of the
"Family Viewing Policy," 95 F.C.C.2d 700 (1983) (the "family viewing" amendment is
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watched by children, a major issue has been the amount of suitable
programming available for children.
The FCC recently concluded thirteen years of wrestling with
this issue. These efforts began in 1971 with proposals that the Com-
mission mandate for each station a minimum number of hours of
reprinted id. at 704 n. 15). This led to litigation on the claim of government censorship
imposed through FCC coercion. Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.
Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). The FCC ruled that the NAB had adopted the amendment
voluntarily and without Commission coercion. 95 F.C.C.2d at 701. In the meantime,
the entire NAB Code was eliminated following a government antitrust action. United
States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982); see United
States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1982) (consent de-
cree terminating antitrust action not contrary to public interest); see also Children's Tele-
vision Programming and Advertising Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, 640-41 n.21 (1984).
The family viewing litigation was finally settled in September 1984. Family Viewing's In-
auspicious Demise, BROADCASTING, Jan. 7, 1985, at 204.
311. In 1971 the Commission, in Children's Programs, 28 F.C.C.2d 368, adopted a
Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making that addressed proposals which
would have eliminated sponsorship of or commercials on children's programs. After
numerous comments, the FCC affirmed that broadcasters have a special obligation to
serve children. Therefore, it announced a policy against overcommercialization and re-
quired an adequate separation between programming and advertising. Action for Chil-
dren's Television, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), reconsid. denied, 55 F.C.C.2d 691 (1975), aff'd,
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977). However, the
Commission declined to ban commercials on children's programs. Id. at 11. The Com-
mission also rejected a proposal that it require television networks to provide instruc-
tional programming to educate children about television advertising and found the
fairness doctrine inapplicable to the issue. Council on Children, Media and Merchandis-
ing, 65 F.C.C.2d 421 (1977). But the Commission kept open the children's program-
ming proceedings to reassess the effectiveness of industry self-regulation. Later, in
Children's Programming and Advertising Practices, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344 (1978) (Second
Notice of Inquiry), it announced a fact-finding inquiry to evaluate the effectiveness of its
self-regulation policy and to assess alternatives to those policies adopted in the 1974
Report. The Commission's staff reported general industry compliance with the FCC's
advertising guidelines and recommended no changes therein. Children's TV Program-
ming and Advertising, 75 F.C.C.2d 138, 139-40 (1979) (Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing). The Federal Trade Commission also studied commercial advertising practices on
children's programming until Congress excluded the subject from FTC review. See Chil-
dren's Advertising: Termination of Rulemaking Proceedings, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,710
(1981); Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 7,
94 Stat. 374, 376 (1979) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(11)(i)(1982)).
More recently, the Commission has rejected a proposed rulemaking requiring
broadcast licensees and cable companies to transmit an electronic signal that would al-
low viewers to block out commercial advertising designed for and directed to children,
Children's Advertising Detector Signal, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 935 (1985); denied
complaints about "program-length commercials" and related advertising issues on chil-
dren's programming, Action for Children's Television v. KTTV, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
61 (1985); and declined to initiate a requested rulemaking proceeding regarding profit-
sharing arrangements between broadcasters and toy companies in the airing of chil-
dren's programming, Profit-Sharing Arrangements in the Broadcasting of Children's
Programming, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 90 (1985).
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age-specific daily programming for children. 2 Although the Com-
mission believed that children require programming designed spe-
cifically for them and that broadcasters have a special obligation to
serve these needs, it declined to prescribe any set number of hours
of such programming.313 Instead, in its 1974 Policy Statement the
Commission relied on industry self-regulation according to estab-
lished guidelines to improve children's programming. 3 4 In order
to monitor the success of such industry efforts, the Commission im-
proved its information-gathering ability. 1 In 1978 it reassessed
the matter, 6 reestablishing its Children's Television Task Force to
evaluate compliance with the earlier guidelines.
The Task Force reported little improvement in broadcasters'
compliance with these guidelines.317 The Task Force also con-
cluded that several factors in the market for children's programs
combine to "create incentives for the commercial television system
to neglect the specific needs of the child audience. ' 3 18 Such a con-
clusion might well have led to onerous regulation.
312. Children's Programs, 28 F.C.C.2d 368 (1971) (Notice of Inquiry and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking). See also En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314
(1960) (Report and Statement of Policy) (declaring "Programs for Children" one of
fourteen "major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs and
desires of the community").
313. Action for Children's Television, 50 F.C.C.2d at 5-6. The Commission based its
decision, in part, on first amendment concerns raised by detailed governmental supervi-
sion of programming and on the expectation that the commercial marketplace would
provide proper incentives for children's programming. Id. at 6.
314. The Commission reminded broadcasters of their obligation to provide program-
ming for both preschool and school-age children. This obligation extended throughout
the week, not just on weekends, and included a reasonable amount of programming
designed to educate and inform. Id. at 7-8.
315. See Action for Children's Television, 53 F.C.C.2d 161, 163 (1975) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order) (stating amendments to broadcast license renewal form; these
amendments also defined children's programming as "programs designed for children
twelve years old and under," meaning programs originally produced and broadcast pri-
marily for such a child audience (emphasis in original)); Children's Television Programs,
58 F.C.C.2d 1169 (1975) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (additional amendments),
reconsid denied, 63 F.C.C.2d 26 (1977).
316. Children's Programming and Advertising Practices, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344 (1978)
(Second Notice of Inquiry).
317. In particular, the Task Force found little increase in the average amount of
broadcast time devoted to children's programs; no significant increase in educational
and instructional programs for children; and few licensees making a meaningful effort to
air age-specific programs. It further found that nearly half of all children's programs
were still shown on the weekends when only eight percent of children's television view-
ing occurs. Children's TV Programming and Advertising, 75 F.C.C.2d 138, 142-43
(1979) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
318. Id. at 145. These factors were the size of the child audience, its limited appeal to
advertisers, and the small number of outlets in most markets.
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In response to the Task Force's economic analysis, however,
the Commission considered simply rescinding its 1974 Policy State-
ment and any specific obligation of broadcasters to serve the child
audience, and relying instead on other sources of children's pro-
gramming such as cable.3 19 Although in 1979 the Commission ac-
knowledged the questionable desirability of relying on technologies
not then available to most households to provide programming for
children, by 1984, when it finally terminated its children's televi-
sion proceedings, the Commission took just such an approach.32'
Indeed, the Commission faulted its Task Force for failing to
consider the wider actual availability of children's programming be-
yond that on commercial broadcast stations.322 Among the sources
of such programming, the Commission noted in particular the avail-
ability of cable television which "passes some 54 percent of all
homes and cannot be avoided in any assessment of the accessibility
of programming to the child audience. '3 23 Consideration of the en-
tire video distribution system, including cable services, led the Com-
mission to reject its Task Force's recommendation of mandatory
programming obligations. Instead, the Commission announced
that a licensee has a continuing duty under the public interest stan-
dard to examine and attend to the program needs of the children's
audience as one significant element of its community. 2 4 But in so
doing, a licensee may consider what other children's program serv-
ices, including cable, are available in its market.325
Upon a petition for review by Action for Children's Television,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam decision upheld
319. Id. at 147.
320. Id. at 152.
321. TV Programming for Children, 96 F.C.C.2d 634 (1984) (Report and Order). See
also The Evening News Association, 89 F.C.C.2d 911 (1982) (denying petition to refuse
license renewals for failure to broadcast regularly scheduled weekday children's pro-
gramming), aff'd sub nom. Washington Ass'n for Television and Children v. FCC, 712
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
322. TV Programming for Children, 96 F.C.C.2d at 644.
323. Id. at 646. The Commission specifically referred to cable channels devoted to
children's programming, such as Kidstime, Nickelodeon, and the Disney Channel. The
Commission also counted some of the programming directed to the child audience on
pay cable services such as Home Box Office. Id.
324. Id. at 655-56.
325. Id. at 656. One dissenting Commissioner called the FCC's action the "funeral
... of the FCC's involvement in children's television." Id. at 658 (Rivera, Comm'r,
dissenting). See also Note, Deregulating Commercial Television: Will the Marketplace Watch Out
for Children?, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 141 (1984).
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the FCC's position. 26 Commenting on the petitioner's challenge to
the Commission's reliance on children's programming available on
cable, 32 7 the court said:
While that medium is not available in all areas or to all
segments of the viewing community, it has a sufficiently
broad and increasing presence that the Commission may
appropriately consider its offerings in determining the ne-
cessity for such nationwide rules as petitioners favored. 28
After thirteen years of impending regulations, then, cable
played a central role in finally relieving broadcasters from more se-
vere interference with their editorial discretion-interference
fraught with troubling constitutional and other implications. 329 Any
view of cable and broadcasting that does not stress their similarity
and substitutability would be disastrous to the liberating function
cable otherwise has performed with respect to children's television.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cable, of course, is not necessarily the complete antidote for all
broadcast regulation that intrudes upon the editorial function. It is
possible to argue, for example, that an adequately and properly in-
formed electorate is so vital to our self-governing, democratic sys-
tem that qualified candidates for public office should have some
right of access to the media. Similarly, one could argue that the con-
sumption or abuse of products such as cigarettes or liquor, though
legal, poses a sufficient public danger that, if we can reduce such
danger by curtailing advertising, then such advertising should be
barred from the mass media. 3 0 Such arguments, however, in no
way involve a scarcity rationale. They must stand or fall on constitu-
tional and other considerations equally applied to all media, includ-
ing print. As Chairman Fowler expressed it:
The litmus test for regulation of the electronic press is
straightforward: hold the regulation next to print "regula-
tion." Would it be permitted for newspapers, periodicals,
326. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per
curiam).
327. The only other issue that the court thought required any discussion was the lack
of an explicit and detailed Commission mandate for age-specific programming.
328. Action for Children's Television, 756 F.2d at 901.
329. See TV Programming for Children, 96 F.C.C.2d at 651-54; cf. id. at 569-71 (Ri-
vera, Comm'r, dissenting) (discussing the legality of such regulation).
330. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2979-80
(1986).
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and books? If not, the regulation should be eliminated.A3
At the very least, any argument for differential regulation of the me-
dia must sustain the heavy burden of justifying itself based on ac-
tual, significant characteristics of the media that are logically and
factually related to the regulation at issue.
What cable can and should do is lay to rest an already much-
discredited scarcity rationale for the regulation of broadcasting.
This depends on the demonstrated similarity and interchangeability
between broadcasting and cable. Rather than arguing whether
cable should be considered constitutionally more like broadcasting
or more like the print media, cable and broadcasting should be
treated as the unified medium they are. This will allow cable to so-
lidify its position as an entity with full first amendment freedom.
Correspondingly, broadcast regulation which depends either di-
rectly upon a scarcity rationale or upon a generalized concept of
broadcasting's susceptibility to regulation which in turn is premised
on the mistaken notion of scarcity, should be rejected as offensive to
the first amendment.
331. Letter from Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC, to Senator Bob Packwood, Chair-
man, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation (Mar. 14, 1984), printed in
Hearings on Freedom of Expression Act, supra note 101, at 240.
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